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INTRODUCTION 
VER the next several years, our nation will implement a his-
toric overhaul of its health care system. That system currently 
encompasses more than seventeen percent of the American econ-
O 
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omy, a figure that is trending upwards.1 Fittingly, then, an unprece-
dented amount of time, effort, and debate contributed to assem-
bling the blueprint for this reform, culminating in the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act (collectively “ACA”).2 
Nonetheless, the ultimate impact of ACA on the American 
health care system remains extremely unclear.3 One of the central 
such uncertainties is how this reform will affect employer spon-
sored insurance (“ESI”), which currently covers over sixty percent 
of the non-elderly American population.4 To date, commentators 
have generally focused on the prospect that employers will choose 
to drop health coverage entirely when ACA’s core reforms are im-
plemented in 2014.5 This prediction is largely driven by the expec-
 
1 See Christopher J. Truffer et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2019: The 
Recession’s Impact Continues, 29 Health Aff. 522, 523 (2010). 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (“HCERA”), Pub. L. 
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). References to these bills initially used the acronym 
“PPACA.” Recent federal publications, however, have switched to the shorter 
“ACA” and we follow that convention here. Throughout this Article, citations to 
“ACA” refer to PPACA and HCERA collectively, except for the instances where 
HCERA amended PPACA; in all instances, the statutes at large citation indicates in 
which of the two bills the relevant citation is located. 
3 In part, this is because much depends on how the states and federal government 
implement the statutory text. See Alan Weil & Raymond Scheppach, New Roles For 
States in Health Reform Implementation, 29 Health Aff. 1178, 1178–79 (2010). At the 
same time, a substantial amount of uncertainty stems from the fact that so many dif-
ferent constituencies helped to produce ACA’s highly complicated and intercon-
nected statutory text, resulting in 2800 pages of bills. See, e.g., John K. Iglehart, Near-
ing Negotiations—Reconciling Key Differences Between House and Senate Reform 
Measures, 362 New Eng. J. Med. e8(1) (2010) (describing some of the contentious 
battles that preceded the passage of ACA). 
4 See Elise Gould, The Erosion of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Declines 
Continue for the Seventh Year Running, 39 Int’l J. Health Servs. 669, 669 (2009) 
(“Employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) remains the most prominent form of 
health coverage in the United States, at 62.9 percent of the under-65 population; 
however, the rate of this coverage has fallen every year since 2000, when 68.3 percent 
had ESI.”). As we make clear in Subsection II.B.2, we mean to include employers’ 
prescription benefit plans within the ambit of ESI. 
5 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarcz, Healthcare Supplement to Abra-
ham’s Insurance Law and Regulation 32 (5th ed. 2010) (“[V]arious employers were 
asked to state their level of agreement with the statement that ‘Our organization 
would be better off if we dropped employee healthcare coverage and simply paid the 
fine.’ 52.5% surveyed strongly disagreed, 15.3% somewhat disagreed, 18% somewhat 
agreed, and 14.1% strongly agreed.”); David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health 
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tation that, beginning in 2014, individual health insurance mar-
kets—wherein consumers purchase health insurance as individuals, 
just as they typically purchase auto and homeowners insurance—
will prove to be a more attractive option than they are presently. If 
so, then employers that drop coverage will face correspondingly 
decreased employee backlash or recruiting difficulties, especially to 
the extent that they pass on the resulting cost savings to employees 
in the form of increased salaries. 
This Article raises a different, but potentially even more dis-
tressing, risk regarding the future of ESI. It argues that there is a 
substantial prospect that ACA will lead some, and perhaps many, 
employers to implement a targeted dumping strategy6 designed to 
induce low-risk employees to retain ESI but incentivize high-risk 
employees to voluntarily opt out of ESI and instead purchase in-
surance through the exchanges that ACA establishes to organize 
individual insurance markets.7 Although ACA and other federal 
laws prohibit employers from excluding high-risk employees from 
ESI, these laws do little to prevent employers from designing their 
plans and benefits to incentivize high-risk employees to voluntarily 
seek coverage elsewhere. If successful, such a targeted dumping 
strategy would allow employers and low-risk employees to avoid 
the costs associated with providing coverage to high-risk employ-
ees, thereby lowering (perhaps substantially) the costs of coverage 
under the employer’s group plan. Employers could pass on some of 
 
Insurance: Is Health Reform a “Game Changer?,” 1 N.Y.U. Rev. Emp. Benefits & 
Executive Compensation 1A-1, 1A-11 (2010) (“Although voters were promised ‘if 
you like your coverage, you can keep it,’ PPACA is likely to cause further unraveling 
of EBC, unless significant modifications are made to its design.”). On the issue of 
early retirees losing their employer-provided health benefits generally, see Richard L. 
Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health 
Benefits, 9 Yale J. Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 287, 301–32 (2009). 
6 The general prospect of insurer dumping of high risks is prominent in the litera-
ture. See, e.g., Randall P. Ellis, Creaming, Skimping and Dumping: Provider Compe-
tition on the Intensive and Extensive Margins, 17 J. Health Econ. 537 (1998). ACA 
also clearly contemplates the dumping of high risks in certain limited contexts. See 
ACA § 1101(e), 124 Stat. at 142–43 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
7 We use the term “high-risk employee” and “low-risk employee” to refer to the 
employee’s expected future health care costs. “High-risk employees” thus encom-
passes employees who are already sick and those who possess characteristics suggest-
ing they are particularly likely to become sick in the future. Of course, high-risk em-
ployees may not ultimately end up incurring large health care expenses. But from an 
insurance perspective, the key question is their risk of incurring future expenses. 
MONAHANSCHWARCZ_PREPP1 2/23/2011  10:19 PM 
2011] Dumping Sick Employees 129 
these savings to high-risk employees through salary increases or 
through tax-free reimbursement of all or part of their individual 
health insurance premiums. Meanwhile, both employers and em-
ployees would avoid any financial penalties under the so-called in-
dividual and employer “mandates.”8 
At its core, the risk of this form of targeted employer dumping 
stems from two basic features of health care reform. First, starting 
in 2014, ACA ensures that all individuals will have guaranteed ac-
cess to individual health insurance at rates that generally do not 
vary based on health status.9 High-risk employees who opt not to 
enroll in employer plans will therefore have relatively attractive 
options available to them on the individual market. Second, despite 
its extensive regulation of individual insurance markets, ACA 
grants self-insured employers10 tremendous freedom in designing 
the terms of their plans.11 Such employers are consequently free to 
design plans that appeal to relatively young and healthy employees 
but are unattractive to high-risk employees. For example, an em-
ployer plan might provide very generous coverage of preventive, 
wellness, and health maintenance services, while imposing large 
cost-sharing requirements on those services that high-risk individu-
als are likely to utilize, such as hospitalization. The plan could even 
exclude from coverage certain high-cost conditions. 
Ultimately, this Article demonstrates that targeted dumping of 
high-risk employees will prove attractive to employers not simply 
 
8 The individual and employer “mandates,” contained in ACA, generally require 
individuals to purchase and employers to offer health insurance or face a monetary 
penalty. See ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244–45 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A); 
ACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253−56 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4980H). 
9 See infra Subsection I.B.1. Contrary to a widely shared misconception, high-risk 
employees will be free to purchase coverage in the health insurance exchanges that 
ACA creates to organize individual insurance markets. See infra Subsection II.A.1. 
Under ACA, individual health insurance premiums are permitted to vary based only 
on age, geographic area, family size, and tobacco use. See infra note 32 and accompa-
nying text. 
10 Employer plans are self-insured where the employer retains the risk of loss asso-
ciated with claims under the health plan. See, e.g., Thompson v. Talquin Bldg. Prods. 
Co., 928 F.2d 649, 653 (4th Cir. 1991). For further explanation of self insurance, see 
infra Subsection I.C.3. Large employers that do not self-insure may also have substan-
tial latitude to design dumping strategies. However, for reasons discussed later, it is 
almost certain that any large employer that chose to pursue a dumping strategy would 
self-insure. Id. 
11 See infra Subsection I.C.3.a. 
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because it can reduce health care costs, but because it can do so 
while protecting the interests of all employees. First, an employer-
dumping strategy can be designed to protect low-risk, but risk-
averse, employees from the prospect of suddenly becoming high-
risk. This requires limiting the risk of medical expenses that cannot 
be anticipated in time for an enrollee to switch to more compre-
hensive coverage in an exchange. Because enrollment in insurance 
exchanges is limited to annual open enrollment periods, employers 
attempting to dump high-risk, but not low-risk, employees will 
likely need to cover medical expenses that cannot be anticipated 
more than a year in advance, even if the plan imposes significant 
cost-sharing with respect to such expenses. 
Second, a targeted employer dumping strategy can be designed 
to protect the interests of high-risk employees to the extent that 
employers are concerned about the labor market consequences of 
failing to provide this protection. In particular, dumping employers 
can largely offset the increased premium costs that a high-risk em-
ployee might face if she elected coverage on an exchange rather 
than ESI. Coverage through an exchange would ordinarily be sub-
stantially more costly to an individual than ESI, as employers con-
tribute a substantial amount to ESI and all costs of ESI can be paid 
with tax-free dollars. But employers that pursue a dumping strat-
egy can provide all migrating employees with a contribution to a 
health reimbursement arrangement (“HRA”) equivalent to—or 
even larger than—the amount that the employer ordinarily con-
tributes to an employee’s coverage. High-risk employees can then 
use this amount, which is excluded from the employee’s taxable in-
come, to purchase coverage on the individual market.12 As a result, 
the only expense to a high-risk employee of opting for coverage in 
the individual market would be that the difference between the 
cost of coverage on an exchange and the employer’s contribution 
to the HRA would be paid on a post-tax basis. This amount that an 
employee would need to pay on a post-tax basis is likely to be 
small, given that employers currently pay on average eighty-three 
percent of the cost of employee-only coverage, and seventy-three 
 
12 For an overview of the tax benefits and requirements of health reimbursement 
arrangements, see I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93. 
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percent of the cost of family coverage.13 In exchange for this mod-
erate increase in cost, high-risk employees would be able to select 
among numerous insurance plans on an exchange, all of which of-
fer federally mandated benefits without preexisting condition ex-
clusions. 
Although almost entirely unrecognized in the public debate 
leading up to ACA or in the regulatory fray since that time, ACA’s 
failure to limit the strategic employer dumping we describe has the 
potential to substantially impair health care reform.14 Most impor-
tantly, employer dumping of high-risk employees could undermine 
the exchanges on which individual markets are expected to operate 
by rendering the pool of policyholders seeking coverage in ex-
changes disproportionately risky relative to the general population. 
Such adverse selection, in turn, would simultaneously increase 
premiums, lower coverage rates, and increase the cost to the fed-
eral government of subsidizing coverage for low- and moderate-
income individuals.15 Ultimately, these forces could render insur-
 
13 Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research & Educ. Trust, Employer Health Bene-
fits: 2009 Annual Survey 68, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/7936.pdf. 
14 Several sources mention in passing the possibility that employers may attempt to 
redesign their plans so as to induce some, but not all, employees to opt for coverage in 
an exchange. See Abraham & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 32 (noting that “[a] third po-
tential result [of reform] is that employers will continue to offer coverage, but that 
such coverage will contain limited benefits”); Hyman, supra note 5, at 1A-15 (noting 
that “some employers will make all-or-nothing coverage decisions for all employees in 
favor of ‘nothing,’ while others will experiment with changing the terms of coverage, 
and the boundaries of the firm and its staffing”); Timothy Jost, Health Insurance Ex-
changes and the Affordable Care Act: Key Policy Issues 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/FundReports/2010/Jul/Heal
th-Insurance-Exchanges-and-the-Affordable-Care-Act.aspx (noting that “[a] particu-
lar concern is the possibility that employer-sponsored groups can ‘self-insure’ (thus 
escaping state regulation) as long as their employees are healthy, only to turn to the 
exchange once group members’ health deteriorates”); id. at 8 (suggesting that “[s]elf-
insured plans are subject to even less rigorous requirements under ACA, and they 
might offer coverage that is substantially less protective, and less costly, than ex-
change coverage”).  
15 See Stephen Finan, Senior Director for Policy at the American Cancer Society 
Cancer Action Network, Testimony at the Interim Meeting of the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners on Health Care Reform Implementation, Ex-
changes (B) Subgroup Meeting (July 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_conliaison_1008_ntlmtg_materials.pdf. It 
is for these reasons that commentators have warned that adverse selection is the pri-
mary threat to insurance exchanges. See Timothy Jost, Consumer-Friendly Ex-
changes, Testimony at the Interim Meeting of the National Association of Insurance 
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ance exchanges unsustainable and thereby jeopardize health insur-
ance reform writ large. 
Not only could employer dumping adversely affect the function-
ing and costs of the individual market, but it would also subvert the 
principle of risk sharing that is at the core of reform.16 Rather than 
sharing medical risks on a community basis at the employer level, 
targeted employer dumping would allow employers and low-risk 
employees to avoid the responsibility of cross-subsidizing the 
health care costs of high-risk employees. This, in turn, could cor-
rode the willingness of the broader American population to shoul-
der the expenses of our country’s comparatively high-cost popula-
tion. 
Fortunately, the threat posed by the prospect of strategic em-
ployer dumping of high-risk employees can be addressed through 
various statutory, and even regulatory, reforms. For instance, indi-
viduals with the option of employer-sponsored coverage could be 
denied access to coverage through health insurance exchanges, as 
is the case in Massachusetts’s version of health care reform. Alter-
natively, employees who secured coverage from an employer with 
a plan designed to dump sick employees could be taxed under the 
individual mandate. Various other fixes are also possible. Although 
the desirability of health insurance reform has proven politically 
divisive, Republicans and Democrats alike should be able to agree 
that employers cannot be allowed to game health care reform by 
dumping only their sickest employees onto state insurance ex-
changes.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by providing a 
more detailed and comprehensive discussion of how and why ACA 
permits self-insured employers to dump high-risk employees onto 
individual insurance markets. Part II then describes various specific 
 
Commissioners on Health Care Reform Implementation, Exchanges (B) Subgroup 
Meeting (July 22, 2010), available at http://naic.org/committees_b_exchanges.htm 
(“The biggest threat to the success of the exchanges will be adverse selection . . . .”).  
16 Of course, ACA does create or recognize various different risk pools, and so it 
does not mandate that all health risks be shared equally across society. But ACA at-
tempts to require that all risk pools are broad and diverse, so as to ensure the broad 
social sharing of health care costs by all individuals and employers. It is this general 
principal of risk sharing that employer dumping undermines, as it permits specific 
employers and employees to participate in unusually low-risk pools by inducing high-
risk employees into other pools. 
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employer dumping strategies, each of which aims to induce high-
risk employees to opt for coverage through exchanges while pro-
viding sufficient security and benefits to low-risk employees so that 
they retain employer provided coverage. Part III suggests that 
many employers are likely to find employer dumping to be an eco-
nomically attractive option. It then offers several regulatory and 
legislative options for limiting this risk. 
I. ACA, RISK CLASSIFICATION, AND THE PROSPECT OF TARGETED 
EMPLOYER DUMPING 
One central premise of health care reform is that competition in 
insurance markets should be less focused on risk classification and 
more focused on improving health care delivery and efficiency. 
ACA takes radically different approaches to accomplishing this in 
individual and employer-sponsored insurance markets. Section A 
of this Part introduces the concept of risk classification and de-
scribes the various approaches that insurers employ to classify 
risks. It distinguishes between direct forms of risk classification, 
wherein insurance rates or coverage are linked to observed health-
related factors and health history, and indirect methods of risk 
classification, wherein plans are designed and marketed so that 
they disproportionately appeal to individuals with particular risk 
profiles. Section B then describes how ACA radically reforms indi-
vidual insurance markets to largely eliminate both direct and indi-
rect forms of risk classification. By contrast, Section C shows that 
ACA does little that is new to affect risk classification in employer 
markets, especially for employers that self-insure the costs of their 
employees’ coverage. Rather, it generally relies on and extends 
pre-ACA law, which prohibited direct risk classification by em-
ployers but largely ignored the prospect of indirect risk classifica-
tion. It is this reliance on the pre-ACA paradigm—and its limited 
regulation of indirect risk classification by employers—that leaves 
employers free to design targeted dumping strategies whose pur-
pose is to induce high-risk employees to opt out of ESI. 
A. Background on Risk Classification 
The idea that employers would consider dumping high-risk em-
ployees is hardly surprising. In fact, dumping of high-risk policy-
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holders is merely a subset of the larger insurer practice of risk clas-
sification.17 At its most fundamental level, risk classification in-
volves pricing insurance based on the expected health care costs of 
a particular individual. But because the risks of some individuals 
can be difficult to predict or are predictably exorbitant, risk classi-
fication can also involve refusing to insure certain individuals or in-
suring them only with respect to specific types of costs or condi-
tions. Historically, health insurers operating in most individual 
markets have spent substantial energy classifying individual risks in 
these ways—linking eligibility, premiums, or benefits to observa-
tions about the risk presented by the individual.18 
Insurance economists have long recognized that in addition to 
these direct forms of risk classification, insurers can also indirectly 
classify individual risk by offering particularized sets of benefits 
that disproportionately appeal to certain types of individuals.19 
Such indirect risk classification does not require insurers to make 
explicit distinctions regarding individuals, but instead relies on in-
dividuals “revealing” their own risk characteristics through their 
insurance purchase decisions. Thus, an insurer wishing only to in-
sure young, healthy people might attract them by offering policies 
that have high deductibles for hospitalizations, premium discounts 
 
17 See Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 
267 JAMA 2503, 2503–04 (1992) (describing various methods of risk classification in 
health insurance markets). 
18 See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 
Kan. L. Rev. 73, 74 (2005) (“Discrimination against unhealthy persons is deeply in-
grained in the health insurance industry and traditionally has been generally accepted 
as a legitimate application of underwriting and risk-classification principles.”); see 
generally Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. 
Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 287, 287 (1993) (exploring a vision of health insurance prem-
ised on social solidarity as contrasted to a vision of health insurance premised on risk 
classification and “actuarial fairness” more generally). To be sure, insurers operating 
in some markets, particularly large group health insurance markets, have often fo-
cused less on risk classification, as such classification can only occur at the group level. 
See Crossley, supra, at 84. Other health insurers have been foreclosed from engaging 
in various forms of risk classification based on state laws. Id. at 85–117. 
19 This literature originated with Akerlof’s famous article on lemons. See George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970); see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium 
in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Infor-
mation, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629, 634–37 (1976). 
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for frequent gym usage, and exclusions for drugs that are dispro-
portionately used by the chronically ill or sick.20 
Risk classification is central to the operation of insurance mar-
kets ranging from life insurance to property insurance to health in-
surance.21 In the absence of such classification, insurance markets 
are susceptible to adverse selection, wherein those who seek insur-
ance are disproportionately high risk.22 Adverse selection can be 
self-reinforcing and, in extreme cases, can lead to the collapse of 
insurance markets in a death spiral.23 Even when adverse selection 
does not pose such dire risks—as is often the case24—risk classifica-
tion is a central way in which insurers compete. Insurers that can 
more accurately predict policyholders’ health care costs can win 
the business of low-risk individuals and avoid issuing coverage to 
high-risk individuals.25 
Although risk classification is commonplace in all insurance 
markets, it has historically produced significant problems in many 
health insurance markets.26 Prior to ACA, individuals with a nega-
tive health history or risk factors were often unable to obtain af-
fordable health insurance or were denied coverage altogether, de-
 
20 See, e.g., M.P. McQueen, Health Insurers Target the Individual Market, Wall St. 
J., Aug. 21, 2007, at D1 (noting that insurers, in an effort to attract young adults, have 
begun offering benefits such as gym memberships and teeth whitening). 
21 Of course, risk classification is different in the health insurance context for a vari-
ety of reasons, including the difficulty of predicting expenses and the fact that a large 
component of health insurance is actually closer to the pre-payment of expected costs 
than to classic insurance. For an overview of risk classification in health and non-
health insurance markets, see Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of 
Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 115–29 (1994). 
22 Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 Yale L.J. 1223, 1235−37 (2004). 
23 The self-reinforcing tendency of adverse selection stems from the fact that, if the 
insured population consists disproportionately of high-risk individuals, insurance 
companies will respond by raising premiums. As premiums rise, only individuals with 
higher levels of risk will find insurance purchase worthwhile, in response to which in-
surers will raise premiums even higher. Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1254. 
24 Id. at 1224−25; see also Bradley Herring & Mark V. Pauly, The Effect of State 
Community Rating Regulations on Premiums and Coverage in the Individual Health 
Insurance Market 20 (NBER Working Paper No. W12504, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12504. 
25 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, 
and Public Policy 64–100 (1986). 
26 See Light, supra note 17.  
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pending on the insurance laws of their state.27 Those who did ac-
quire coverage were subject to preexisting condition exclusions28 
and the prospect of rescissions. Insurers sometimes retained sub-
stantial discretion to define preexisting conditions broadly and to 
rescind coverage even for innocent and potentially irrelevant omis-
sions or misstatements in policyholders’ applications for coverage.29 
B. ACA’s Reform of Risk Classification in Individual Markets 
ACA radically reforms individual insurance markets to substan-
tially reduce risk classification. This Section describes the ways in 
which ACA attempts to eliminate both direct and indirect forms of 
risk classification by insurers. 
1. ACA’s Regulation of Direct Risk Classification in Individual 
Markets 
Starting in 2014, ACA will fundamentally change the individual 
health insurance market by prohibiting virtually all direct methods 
of risk classification.30 At that time, all health insurers will be pro-
 
27 See Crossley, supra note 18, at 109–13 (reviewing various state laws addressing 
discrimination based on health status). 
28 Individuals were protected from preexisting condition exclusions only where they 
had coverage for at least eighteen months, most recently under an employer group 
plan, and had not had a break in coverage of sixty-three days or longer. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1181 (2006). 
29 See, e.g., Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Case Studies: Examples of Health In-
surance Companies Rescinding Individual Policies (July 27, 2009), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/ Press_111/20090727/15%20Fact%20Sheet- Exam-
ples%20of%20Health%20Insurance%20Companies%20Rescinding%20Individual%
20Policies.pdf. An investigation and hearing by the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce in 2009 found that insurers often abused their authority to rescind policies 
in order to avoid paying expensive claims, targeting patients with breast cancer, lym-
phoma, and numerous other serious conditions for rescission and praising employers 
for terminating the coverage of such policyholders. Id. Additionally, it concluded that 
insurers frequently rescinded coverage based on trivial omissions in policyholders’ 
applications that were often unrelated to the policyholder’s illness. Id.; see also 
Memorandum from the Comm. on Energy & Commerce Staff to Members and Staff 
of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Supplemental Information Regard-
ing the Individual Health Insurance Market 7−8 (June 16, 2009), available at http:/ 
/energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090616/rescission_supplemental.pdf (find-
ing approximately 20,000 rescissions by three large insurance companies over five 
years, saving those insurers $300 million in claims). 
30 Like most insurance markets, individual health insurance markets prior to ACA 
were regulated almost entirely at the state level. States varied dramatically in how 
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hibited from denying coverage to an applicant, limiting coverage of 
an individual’s preexisting conditions, or rescinding a contract for 
unintentional misstatements once coverage has been granted.31 In-
surers will be required to price coverage on a modified-community 
rating basis, where premiums can vary only based on age, family 
size, tobacco use, and geographic area, and even then only within 
certain ranges.32 
Prohibiting the use of these practices raises significant adverse 
selection concerns.33 After all, if insurers are required to offer cov-
erage to everyone who applies, at community rates, with no exclu-
sion of preexisting conditions, then individuals will be inclined to 
wait to purchase health insurance coverage until it is needed. In 
order to combat the prospect of such adverse selection, ACA re-
 
tightly they regulated these markets. See Kaiser Family Found., Individual Market 
Rate Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals), 2010, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=354&cat=7 (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2010). Most states, however, allowed insurers in individual insurance markets 
to engage in some forms of risk classification. See id. 
31 ACA § 1001, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 130−31 (2010) (adding § 2712 to 
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)) (rescissions) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg-12); ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–55 (adding § 2704 to the PHSA) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3) (preexisting conditions); ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156 
(adding § 2702 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1) (guaranteed 
availability); ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156 (adding § 2703 to the PHSA) (to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2) (guaranteed renewability); ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–
60 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (prohibiting 
discrimination). 
 Limited exceptions apply to insurers’ obligations to accept new policyholders that 
are not relevant to this analysis. These include the prospect that an insurer is finan-
cially unstable and thus must stop accepting policyholders. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-
1(d) (LexisNexis 2010) (application of financial capability limits). 
32 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 155–56 (adding § 2701 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg) (fair premiums). Note that premiums will only be allowed to vary by 
three times for age, id., which is likely to be less than current disparities based on age. 
See, e.g., Elizabeth Simantov et al., Market Failure? Individual Insurance Markets for 
Older Americans, 20 Health Aff. 139, 144–46 (2001) (finding that premiums for indi-
viduals age sixty were three to four times more expensive than premiums for indi-
viduals age twenty-five); Healthreform.gov, Strengthening the Health Insurance Sys-
tem: How Health Insurance Reform will Help America’s Older and Senior Women 5, 
available at http://healthreform.gov/reports/seniorwomen/seniorwomenreport.pdf 
(stating that premiums for older women in the individual market are roughly four 
times greater than those in the group market). 
33 See Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber, & Robin McKnight, The Importance of 
the Individual Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, N.E.J.M. (Jan. 12, 2011), 
available at http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=13572&query=TOC. 
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quires that all individuals purchase health insurance coverage 
unless they “cannot afford coverage,” meaning that the individual’s 
“required contribution . . . for coverage . . . exceeds eight percent 
of such individual’s household income . . . .”34 In order to make 
coverage affordable for a larger number of individuals, ACA also 
provides refundable tax credits for individuals with income be-
tween one hundred percent and four hundred percent of the fed-
eral poverty level, as well as cost-sharing subsidies.35 
2. ACA’s Efforts to Limit Indirect Risk Classification in Individual 
Markets 
ACA’s prohibitions on direct risk classification methods are not 
sufficient to eliminate insurers’ capacity to classify risks. Recogniz-
ing this, ACA supplements its prohibitions on direct risk classifica-
tion with various measures that also prevent or limit indirect classi-
fication by insurers.36 
a. Plan Design 
First, and most importantly, ACA imposes various restrictions 
and requirements on the content of insurers’ coverage in individual 
markets. These include prohibitions on annual and lifetime limits, 
as well as a mandate to cover preventive services in full with no 
cost sharing. The most significant of these coverage requirements is 
that all insurance issued on the individual market must cover “es-
sential health benefits” (“EHBs”).37 This includes (1) coverage for 
 
34 ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 246−47 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A). Individuals 
without coverage for a period of longer than three months face a penalty equal to the 
greater of $695 per individual per year (up to a maximum of three times that amount, 
$2085, per family) or 2.5% of household income. HCERA §1002(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A) (amending 
PPACA § 10106(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 909 (2010) (amending 
PPACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 246−47)). 
35 ACA § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213–20 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B); ACA § 1402, 124 
Stat. at 220–24 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071). 
36 The effectiveness of these attempts to limit indirect risk classification depends 
largely on how these measures are implemented. For one analysis of this issue, see 
Finan, supra note 15. 
37 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 161 (adding § 2707 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-6) (“A health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in 
the individual or small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the es-
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specific treatments and services, and (2) cost-sharing limits on such 
benefits.38 ACA delegates to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) the responsibility for defining the substantive 
coverage terms of EHBs but specifies that EHBs must include cov-
erage for hospitalization, emergency services, prescription drugs, 
and laboratory services (among others).39 The most significant 
guidance given to the Secretary in defining EHBs is a requirement 
that they be equal in scope to those offered by a “typical employer 
plan.”40 Thus, while ACA describes the basic contours of EHBs, it 
leaves substantial discretion to HHS about its particulars. 
Although these coverage mandates for plans operating in the in-
dividual market can be defended in various ways, one of their key 
functions is to limit insurers’ capacities to indirectly classify risks. 
By establishing mandatory coverage floors, these rules limit the 
capacity of insurers in individual markets to design their plans to 
appeal primarily to low-risk individuals. 
b. Provider Networks and Exchanges 
A second way in which ACA limits the prospect of indirect risk 
classification is through the establishment of insurance exchanges 
for the individual market.41 An exchange is an entity that helps or-
ganize an underlying market and facilitate comparison shopping by 
 
sential health benefits package required under section 1302(a) of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act.”). 
38 See ACA § 1302, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 163–68 (2010) (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 18022). Out-of-pocket expenses (the amount that an individual must 
spend out-of-pocket on covered care, including co-payments, deductibles, etc.) must 
be limited to approximately $5950 for individual coverage and $11,900 for family cov-
erage (in 2010 numbers). See id. § 1302(c), 124 Stat. at 165; I.R.C. § 223(c) (2006); 
Rev. Proc. 2009-29, 2009-22 I.R.B. 
39 See ACA § 1302(b), 124 Stat. at 163–64 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022). 
40 For a lengthier discussion of essential health benefits, see Amy B. Monahan, Ini-
tial Thoughts on Essential Health Benefits, 1 N.Y.U. Rev. Emp. Benefits & Executive 
Compensation 1B1, 1B4–1B8 (2010). 
41 Starting in 2014, each state must establish such an exchange to facilitate the pur-
chase of health insurance. ACA § 1321(b), 124 Stat. at 186 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18041). See generally Jost, supra note 15. State insurance exchanges will also organ-
ize the small group market in addition to the individual market. See ACA § 1311(b), 
124 Stat. at 173. 
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buyers.42 ACA requires each state to establish an exchange to be 
administered either by a government agency or non-profit corpora-
tion,43 and it is expected that a substantial portion of the individual 
insurance market will operate on these exchanges.44 In part, this is 
because they are designed to improve consumer shopping and help 
replicate various economies of scale found in large group markets. 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, individuals can only 
receive federal subsidies for coverage when they purchase cover-
age on an exchange.45 
Individual insurance plans offered in state exchanges must meet 
additional criteria regarding plan design, which are encompassed in 
the requirement that they be “Qualified Health Plans.”46 Most im-
portantly, qualified health plans must “ensure a sufficient choice of 
providers.”47 Like the limitations on benefit designs described 
above, this restriction on provider networks limits insurers’ capac-
ity to indirectly classify risks. For instance, it prevents insurers 
from developing a network of providers that are located predomi-
nantly in geographic areas with a comparatively young or healthy 
population, or from forming a network without any specialists, as 
both types of limited network would likely be considered to offer 
an inadequate choice of providers. 
 
42 Timothy Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-
health-reform/Papers/Insurance_Exchanges.pdf. 
43 ACA § 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 176 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). If a state 
does not choose to establish an exchange, the federal government is authorized to es-
tablish one for that state’s residents. See ACA § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186–87 (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041). 
44 Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act,” as amended at 4 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/Ac-
tuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf (estimating that 16 million indi-
viduals will be covered through exchanges). 
45 ACA § 1401, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. 
§ 36B); id. § 1402, 124 Stat. at 220–24 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071). Exchanges 
are directed to work with the Department of Treasury to get the amount of the credit 
advanced and paid directly to the insurer, negating the need for the individual to pay 
and be reimbursed only when filing her tax return for the year. See ACA §§ 1411–12, 
124 Stat. at 224–33 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081–82). 
46 See ACA § 1301, 124 Stat. at 162–63 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021). 
47 ACA § 1311(c)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 174 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
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Additionally, officials are endowed with discretion in deciding 
which plans can be offered through an exchange.48 While the basis 
on which exchange officials will exercise such direction is not yet 
clear, it is likely that one of the central factors they will evaluate is 
whether plans offered in the exchange are attempting to indirectly 
classify risks.49 To the extent that regulators or exchange operators 
perceive this to be the case, they could ban a carrier from the ex-
change and thus substantially limit its capacity to compete in the 
individual market. 
c. Risk Adjustment Mechanisms 
A third approach that ACA employs to discourage indirect risk 
classification by insurers in individual markets is a trio of risk ad-
justment mechanisms. Two of these arrangements operate as tem-
porary reinsurance programs for insurers in individual insurance 
markets.50 Reinsurance essentially provides insurance for insurers.51 
First, ACA establishes a temporary reinsurance program that pro-
tects insurers in individual markets against the risk that their poli-
cyholders will disproportionately suffer from expensive condi-
tions.52 Second, ACA also reinsures insurers in both the individual 
and small group markets against the risk that their medical costs 
will be greater than 103% of expectations.53 Both programs limit 
 
48 See ACA § 1301, 124 Stat. at 162–63 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021) (defin-
ing a “qualified health plan” as a plan offered by a health insurance issuer that is “li-
censed and in good standing” and that complies with “such other requirements as an 
applicable Exchange may establish”). 
49 See ACA § 1311(c)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 174 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) 
(providing that the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to ensure that no qualified 
health plan will “employ marketing practices or benefit designs that have the effect of 
discouraging the enrollment in such plan by individuals with significant health 
needs”). 
50 See Mark A. Hall, The Three Types of Reinsurance Created by Federal Health 
Care Reform, 29 Health Aff. 1168, 1170–71 (2010). A third reinsurance program ends 
prior to 2014 and involves reinsurance for the expenses that employers incur in pro-
viding health benefits to early retirees. See id. at 1169. 
51 See generally Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 Conn. 
Ins. L.J. 345, 350 (2009). 
52 ACA § 1341, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 208–11 (2010) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 18061). 
53 ACA § 1342, 124 Stat. at 211–12 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18062). 
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insurers’ incentives to classify risks by blunting the possibility that 
the failure to indirectly classify risks will increase costs.54 
In addition to these reinsurance programs, ACA establishes a 
prospective risk assessment mechanism. This program extends in-
definitely and charges low actuarial risk plans a penalty while pro-
viding payments to high actuarial risk plans.55 Unlike the two rein-
surance programs, this risk assessment program not only mitigates 
the cost to insurers with high-risk policyholders, but it also reduces 
the benefits to insurers with low-risk policyholders. It therefore 
limits both the potential negative consequences of failing to engage 
in indirect risk classification and the potential gains to insurers that 
successfully use indirect risk classification to attract low-risk poli-
cyholders. 
C. ACA’s Reform of Group Markets and the 
Capacity of Employers to Dump 
In contrast to insurers in the individual market, most employers 
engaged in relatively little risk classification prior to ACA. For this 
reason, ACA does little to alter the risk-classification landscape 
with respect to employers.56 This Section first provides some back-
ground on the regulation of employer plans prior to ACA and then 
explores how ACA affects both direct and indirect forms of risk 
classification in this market. It shows that ACA largely affirms and 
extends preexisting federal laws preventing direct forms of risk 
classification in group markets, such as discrimination in premiums 
or cost sharing among different policyholders. But it also demon-
strates that ACA leaves employers largely free to engage in vari-
ous forms of indirect risk classification, particularly if they self-
insure their health plans. 
 
54 Hall acknowledges that the primary purpose of § 1341 is to blunt adverse selec-
tion, but suggests that the purpose of § 1342 is instead to limit actuarial uncertainty. 
Hall, supra note 50, at 1170–71. Both programs, however, simultaneously accomplish 
both goals, and identifying which goal is primary is a difficult exercise. 
55 ACA § 1343, 124 Stat. at 212–13 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18063). 
56 See Timothy Jost, How Does the Health Reform Legislation Affect Self-Insured 
Plans?, O’Neill Institute Legal Solutions in Health Reform Blog (Mar. 31, 2010, 5:24 
PM), http://oneillhealthreform.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/how-does-the-heal 
th-reform-legislation-affect-self-insured-plans.  
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1. Regulation of Employer Plans Pre-ACA 
Prior to ACA, employer-provided health plans were primarily 
governed by two federal laws, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(“I.R.C.”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”).57 The I.R.C. provides important tax benefits to 
employer-provided coverage.58 For example, it excludes from both 
federal income and payroll tax the cost of employer-provided 
health insurance coverage.59 The I.R.C. also allows employers to es-
tablish cafeteria plans to allow employees to pay their share of 
health insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis.60 As a result, it is 
possible to exclude from taxable income the entire amount of pre-
miums in an employer-sponsored plan. In contrast, similar tax ad-
vantages are available for non-employer coverage only if an indi-
vidual is self-employed.61 
ERISA regulates many aspects of employer plan administration, 
reporting, disclosure, and remedies. However, it only lightly regu-
lates the substance of group health plan coverage. At present, it 
contains just four such requirements: minimum hospital stays fol-
 
57 Employer plans are also affected by various federal income tax regulations, some 
of which mirror provisions in ERISA. For example, the requirements of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and the Consolidated Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) are contained in both statutes. Com-
pare I.R.C. §§ 4980B(f), 9802 (2006), and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161–65, 1182 (2006) (ERISA), 
with Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
100 Stat. 82, 222, 227, §§ 10001, 10002(a) (1986) (amending I.R.C. and ERISA, re-
spectively), and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939, 2073, §§ 101(a), 401(a) (1996) (amending ERISA 
and I.R.C., respectively). Because the federal tax treatment does not directly affect 
use of risk classification, discussion of the tax code provisions that affect group health 
plans is largely omitted from this Article. 
58 It also regulates certain other aspects of plan terms and administration. For in-
stance, the Code also imposes additional requirements on group health plans, such as 
the requirement to offer continuation coverage in the event that an employee loses 
her employer-provided health coverage as a result of a qualifying event. I.R.C. 
§ 4980B(f). 
59 Id. at § 106. Most states follow the federal tax treatment and exempt such pay-
ments from state income tax as well. See Richard W. Genetelli, Tax Management 
Multistate Tax Portfolios, Personal Income Taxes: Alabama Through Michigan, 
3010.01.B.2 (2002). 
60 See I.R.C. § 125. 
61 See id. § 162(l)(1), (4) (indicating that self-employed individuals are eligible to 
deduct the cost of health insurance premiums from their taxable income and that the 
deduction may not be taken for self-employment tax purposes).  
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lowing childbirth, breast reconstruction following mastectomy, a 
mental health parity requirement,62 and a limitation on the exclu-
sion of preexisting conditions.63 ERISA also incorporates the non-
discrimination provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which prohibit group health plans 
from discriminating on the basis of health factors with respect to 
eligibility, benefits, or premiums.64 
In addition to this federal regulation, employers that purchase 
group insurance policies rather than self-insuring are also indirectly 
subject to state insurance regulation. Under ERISA, states are ex-
plicitly permitted to regulate the content of coverage that insurers 
offer to employers.65 To date, states have exercised this authority 
regularly, enacting numerous coverage mandates requiring insurers 
to cover a wide variety of benefits.66 
By contrast, ERISA forbids states from extending any of these 
insurance laws to employer plans that self-insure their employees’ 
coverage.67 At its most basic level, an employer self-insures a plan 
 
62 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1185, 1185a, 1185b (minimum hospital stays, mental health par-
ity, and reconstructive surgery, respectively) (2006).  
63 A plan may exclude coverage for a preexisting condition for a maximum of twelve 
months. Id. § 1181(a)(2). That maximum exclusion period is reduced by the amount 
of any prior creditable coverage the individual had. Id. § 1181(a)(3). For example, if 
an individual had coverage under an employer plan for twelve months and then 
switched employers and became covered under the new employer’s plan without a 
break in coverage, the new employer’s plan could not enforce any preexisting condi-
tion limitation for that employee. 
64 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939, § 101 (1996) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 1182). ERISA also contains a general nondiscrimination provision in § 510, 
but courts have held that an employer health plan does not violate § 510 merely by 
amending the terms of the plan in a way that has a disparate impact on employees 
with a particular condition or disability. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 
F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1991). 
65 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This is an extension of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
which affirms the primacy of the states in regulating insurance. Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal 
Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13, 20–26 (1993). 
66 See generally Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Mar-
ket? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1361, 
1363–64 (2007). 
67 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724, 746–47 (1985); see generally Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured 
Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. 
& Ethics 89 (2005) (describing the evolution of the caselaw on self-insured health 
plans). 
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where it retains liability to pay plan benefits rather than transfer 
that risk to an insurance company. Historically, large employers 
have been much more likely to self-insure than small employers,68 
as the size of their workforce tends to ensure that employees’ 
health care expenditures will be relatively steady over time, de-
creasing the need to shed risk to a third-party insurer. 
Increasingly, however, mid-size and even small employers have 
opted to self-insure and purchase stop-loss insurance to protect 
themselves from the risk that their employees will experience un-
usually high claims in a given year.69 Stop-loss insurance, a form of 
reinsurance, reimburses the employer once claims under the plan 
exceed a specified level either on an individual participant or plan-
wide basis.70 Self-insured plans do not lose their exemption from 
state insurance regulation when they purchase stop-loss insurance.71 
The end result is that nearly all employer plans are subject to the 
requirements of ERISA and HIPAA, but they are subject to state 
regulation only if the employer purchases a group insurance policy 
to fund benefits. 
Prior to ACA, then, all employer plans were prohibited from 
engaging in direct risk classification because of HIPAA’s prohibi-
tion on discrimination based on health status. Self-insured plans, 
however, did have the ability to engage in indirect risk classifica-
tion through plan design. As will be discussed in more detail in Part 
III, though, few self-insured employers historically did so. 
 
68 See Kaiser Family Found. & Health Res. & Educ. Trust, Employer Health Bene-
fits: 2010 Annual Survey 174, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf (pro-
viding the percentage of employers that self-insured, by employer size, from 1999-
2010). 
69 See Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining 
the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 Harv. J. Legis. 233, 234–35 (1997). In 2009, 
among all workers covered by employer plans, fifty-seven percent were covered by 
self-insured plans. Kaiser Family Found. & Health Res. & Educ. Trust, supra note 13, 
at 157. The propensity of firms to self-insure varies with size. In firms with 5000 or 
more employees, eighty-eight percent of covered workers are enrolled in self-insured 
plans. Id. In firms with 3-199 employees, fifteen percent of covered employees are en-
rolled in self-insured plans. Id. 
70 Paredes, supra note 69, at 249–50. 
71 See, e.g., Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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2. ACA’s Regulation of Direct Risk Classification in Group Markets 
Although ACA extends some of the protections against direct 
risk classification in group markets that existed prior to reform, it 
largely leaves in place the pre-reform regime described above. For 
instance, ACA’s guaranteed issue requirements and prohibition on 
rescissions apply to all employer plans, whether insured or self-
insured, but its premium pricing restrictions apply only to the indi-
vidual and small group markets.72 This makes sense because 
HIPAA’s existing requirements regarding premium setting are in 
fact stricter than ACA’s, prohibiting premium setting based on all 
health-related factors, including age and tobacco use.73 ACA does 
technically subject employers to its provisions prohibiting discrimi-
nation against enrollees based on health status, though this is 
largely duplicative of employers’ responsibilities under HIPAA.74 
Similarly, while ACA eliminates the capacity of employers to use 
preexisting condition exclusions, this is much less of a shift for em-
ployer plans than for the individual market, as HIPAA already 
substantially limited the use of such clauses in employer plans. In 
the end, ACA changes little about the ability of employers to di-
rectly classify risk because such restrictions were already largely in 
place. 
3. ACA’s (Lack of) Regulation of Indirect Risk Classification in 
Group Markets 
ACA does relatively little to address the prospect that employ-
ers, particularly those that are self-insured, will implement health 
insurance plans designed to disproportionately appeal to low-risk 
employees. Much to the contrary, ACA seems to assume that em-
ployers will continue to voluntarily offer relatively generous plans, 
as it directs the Secretary of HHS to define essential health bene-
 
72 See ACA § 1001, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 131 (2010) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12) (adding § 2712 to the PHSA); ACA § 1201, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119, 155–56 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–gg-1) (adding 
§§ 2701 and 2702 to the PHSA). 
73 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006). 
74 Compare ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–60 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) 
(adding § 2705 to the PHSA), with 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (HIPAA). 
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fits so that they are no less generous than a typical employer plan.75 
This Subsection reviews the provisions of ACA that potentially 
implicate the capacity or willingness of employers to engage in in-
direct risk classification by designing plans that disproportionately 
appeal to low-risk employees. It demonstrates that self-insured 
employers face minimal legal impediments in implementing a plan 
designed to indirectly induce high-risk employees to opt out of ESI 
in favor of coverage on the individual market. 
a. Plan Benefits 
ACA’s requirements regarding the substance of plan benefits 
vary based on whether the employer purchases insurance or self-
insures. Group coverage for small employers is subject to the same 
requirement as individual insurance markets, and therefore such 
plans must offer essential health benefits.76 By contrast, neither 
large group insurance plans nor self-insured employers are re-
quired by ACA to offer essential health benefits to their policy-
holders. Instead, these plans are subject to only a few specific re-
quirements, each of which apply broadly to all insurance plans and 
group health plans. First, all employer plans must offer full cover-
age, with no cost sharing, for all preventive health services.77 Sec-
ond, employer plans must cover routine patient care costs of indi-
viduals participating in clinical trials.78 Third, ACA sets overall 
limits on the maximum out-of-pocket spending a plan can require 
per participant per year, although these out-of-pocket annual limits 
apply only to the covered benefits that an employer plan provides.79 
Fourth, the statute restricts annual and lifetime caps on coverage,80 
 
75 For a lengthier discussion of essential health benefits, see Monahan, supra note 
40, at 3–5. 
76 See supra Subsection I.B.2.a; ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 161 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-6) (adding § 2707 to the PHSA). 
77 ACA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 131–32 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13) (adding 
§ 2713 to the PHSA). 
78 ACA § 10103, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 892–96 (2010) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8) (adding § 2709 to the PHSA). 
79 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 161 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6) (adding 
§ 2707(b) to the PHSA). These limits are the same that are applicable to individual 
plans. See supra note 37. 
80 ACA § 10101, 124 Stat. at 883–84 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11) (adding 
§ 2711 to the PHSA). 
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although it does not require employers to offer any particular 
benefits. Interestingly, these provisions prohibit large and self-
insured employers from placing annual and lifetime caps on essen-
tial health benefits starting in 2014.81 As a result, while large and 
self-insured employers need not offer essential health benefits at 
all, they cannot offer limited essential health benefits in conjunc-
tion with lifetime or annual limits.  
Large employers who purchase a group insurance policy will, 
however, remain subject to state insurance regulation. The ability 
of such plans to design benefits in order to indirectly classify risks 
will consequently vary based on the flexibility of state regulation. 
Self-insured plans, on the other hand, will enjoy nearly complete 
freedom to design benefits to classify risk. To take an extreme ex-
ample, a self-insured employer could implement a health plan that 
covers preventive services, the four coverages required by ERISA, 
routine patient care costs of individuals participating in clinical tri-
als, and nothing else. 
Alternatively, a self-insured plan could simply exclude coverage 
for specific high-cost conditions such as AIDS, diabetes, and he-
mophilia. While potentially an issue under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits discrimination with re-
spect to disability,82 employer health plans may employ a disability-
based distinction provided that the plan provision is not being used 
as a “subterfuge” to intentionally violate the ADA.83 A disability-
based distinction is a “subterfuge” if it is not justified by the risks 
or costs associated with the disability.84 For example, a plan may re-
fute a claim of subterfuge by showing that the disparate treatment 
is justified by legitimate actuarial data or that the challenged provi-
sion “is necessary . . . to prevent the occurrence of an unacceptable 
change either in the coverage of the health insurance plan, or in the 
premiums charged . . . .”85 This gives employers a tremendous 
amount of discretion in carving out entire categories of treatment, 
 
81 Id. 
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006). 
83 Id. § 12201(c); EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 to Employer-Provided Health Insurance, No. 915.002, Subsection 
III.C.2.b–d (June 8, 1993), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html. 
84 EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 83. 
85 Id. at Subsection III.C.2.d. 
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even if doing so would create disability-based distinctions, pro-
vided that such treatments are in fact high-cost and will therefore 
create the needed actuarial data.86 In the end, neither ACA nor 
other existing sources of law substantially restrict the ability of self-
insured plans to engage in indirect risk classification through the 
design of plan benefits. 
b. Provider Network 
ACA leaves employers (whether insured or self-insured) largely 
free to design their provider networks however they see fit. It re-
quires only that “[a] group health plan and a health insurance is-
suer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall 
not discriminate with respect to participation under the plan or 
coverage against any health care provider who is acting within the 
scope of that provider’s license or certification under applicable 
State law.”87 This provision does “not require that a group health 
plan or health insurance issuer contract with any health care pro-
vider willing to abide by the terms and conditions for participation 
established by the plan or issuer.”88 Rather, it bars discrimination 
against licensed medical practitioners, such as chiropractors, acu-
puncturists, massage therapists, and midwives. At the extreme, 
employers are free to implement a health maintenance organiza-
tion (“HMO”)-style plan wherein enrollees are required to seek 
care only from employee-providers within the HMO. 
c. Wellness Plans 
Unlike insurers in the individual market, employers of all sizes 
are permitted under ACA to establish “wellness programs” for 
their enrollees.89 Wellness programs create incentives for enrollees 
 
86 For an overview of how courts have interpreted the ADA coverage requirements 
as applied to health plans, see Timothy Frey, Your Insurance Does Not Cover That: 
Disability-Based Discrimination Where It Hurts the Most, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 636, 
642–56 (2010); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale 
L.J. 1, 27–32 (2004) (providing an overview and critique of how private health insur-
ance fits into legal protections for the disabled). 
87 ACA § 1201, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 160 (2010) (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-5) (adding § 2706 to the PHSA). 
88 Id. 
89 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–57 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (adding 
§ 2705(j)(1)(A) to the PHSA) (“[A] program of health promotion or disease preven-
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to take measures to promote health or prevent disease, usually by 
offering premium rebates, cost-sharing reductions, or financial 
perks.90 Perhaps the most common example of such a program is 
one that pays a portion of an enrollee’s gym membership if she vis-
its the gym a specified number of times each month. Although de-
signed to incentivize healthy living among policyholders, wellness 
programs provide employers with yet another risk classification 
tool because of their ability to lower costs for comparatively 
healthy enrollees.91 
ACA permits two different types of wellness programs. First, it 
permits those not “based on an individual satisfying a standard that 
is related to a health status factor” and “made available to all simi-
larly situated individuals.”92 Examples include gym membership re-
imbursement, diagnostic testing programs, and smoking cessation 
programs.93 Second, it permits wellness programs “based on an in-
dividual satisfying a standard that is related to a health status fac-
tor,” but only under much more stringent conditions.94 These in-
clude the requirement that any reward “not exceed 30 percent of 
the cost of employee-only coverage under the plan” and that the 
program be “reasonably designed to promote health or prevent 
disease.”95 A program meets this latter requirement if it “has a rea-
sonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease 
in, participating individuals and it is not overly burdensome, is not 
a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status factor, and 
is not highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or 
prevent disease.”96 A reward for actually quitting smoking would 
be an example of this latter type of program. 
 
tion (referred to in this subsection as a ‘wellness program’) shall be a program offered 
by an employer that is designed to promote health or prevent disease that meets the 
applicable requirements of this subsection.” (emphasis added)). 
90 For a brief overview of wellness programs, see Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidar-
ity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 199, 214–17 
(2008). 
91 See Harald Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform—Problems 
with Wellness Incentives, 362 New Eng. J. Med. e3 (2010). 
92 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–57 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (adding 
§ 2705(j) to the PHSA). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
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d. Risk Adjustment Mechanisms 
ACA largely excludes employers, especially those that are self-
insured, from the risk-sharing arrangements described above that 
are designed to mute insurers’ incentives to attract comparatively 
healthy risks.97 First, and most importantly, self-insured employers 
are specifically exempt from participation in the permanent Pro-
spective Risk Assessment mechanism, which charges low actuarial 
risk plans a penalty while providing payments to high actuarial risk 
plans.98 In the long term, then, ACA provides no mechanism that 
would affect the financial benefits a self-insured employer might 
derive from dumping high-risk employees on the individual market 
or otherwise not insuring such individuals. 
Second, both self-insured employers and employers who pur-
chase insurance coverage in the large group market are also largely 
(but not entirely) unaffected by the two temporary reinsurance 
programs that ACA establishes in part to limit insurers’ incentives 
to indirectly classify risk.99 Under both programs, employers are in-
eligible to receive any reinsurance payments if their enrollees are 
disproportionately costly; indeed, both provisions are specifically 
labeled as reinsurance programs for “plans in individual and small 
group markets.”100 But in the case of the reinsurance program es-
tablished in Section 1341 of ACA, which reinsures individual mar-
ket insurers that have a disproportionate share of policyholders 
with high risk conditions, contributions must be made by “third 
party administrators on behalf of group health plans” in addition to 
other insurers.101 Moreover, while ACA delegates to the HHS Sec-
retary the authority to determine the amounts of these contribu-
tions, it provides that they “may be based on . . . the total costs of 
 
97 See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
98 ACA § 1343, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 212–13 (2010) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 18063) (providing that “each State shall assess a charge on health plans 
and health insurance issuers (with respect to health insurance coverage) . . . if the ac-
tuarial risk of the enrollees of such plans or coverage for a year is less than the aver-
age actuarial risk of all enrollees in all plans or coverage in such State for such year 
that are not self-insured group health plans (which are subject to the provisions of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974)” (emphasis added)). 
99 See supra Subsection I.B.2.c. 
100 ACA §§ 1341–42, 124 Stat. at 208–12 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061–62). 
101 ACA § 1341(b), 124 Stat. at 209–10 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18061). 
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providing benefits to enrollees in self-insured plans.”102 As such, it 
is possible—but by no means certain—that employers with rela-
tively low-cost enrollees (including those that self-insure) would 
owe a larger contribution to this reinsurance program for the three 
years of its operation. 
e. General Anti-Dumping Provisions 
Although ACA creates and extends various rules prohibiting 
explicit forms of direct risk classification by employers, it does not 
supplement these rules with a broader standard prohibiting indi-
rect risk classification. This is perhaps surprising, as ACA does 
contain precisely such a broad standard in its provisions governing 
the creation and operation of temporary high-risk pools.103 These 
pools are temporary insurance programs designed to cover indi-
viduals with preexisting conditions or who have been uninsured for 
six months until 2014, when they can purchase coverage in the in-
dividual market without penalty for their high risk status.104 ACA 
instructs the HHS Secretary to “establish criteria for determining 
whether health insurance issuers and employment-based health 
plans have discouraged an individual from remaining enrolled in 
prior coverage based on that individual’s health status.”105 If either 
an insurer or an employer is found to have engaged in such dump-
ing, it shall reimburse “the program . . . for the medical expenses 
incurred by the program for an individual who, based on criteria 
established by the Secretary, the Secretary finds was encouraged 
by the issuer to disenroll from health benefits coverage prior to en-
rolling in coverage through the program.”106 
The statute is crystal-clear, however, that these generalized anti-
dumping rules apply only to dumping on to high-risk pools, and not 
to potential dumping on to individual insurance markets or ex-
changes. First, these anti-dumping rules are contained in Section 
1101 of ACA, which solely concerns temporary high-risk pools. In-
deed, the provision is entitled “Immediate Access to Insurance for 
 
102 ACA § 1341(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 210 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18061). 
103 ACA § 1101(e), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 142–43 (2010) (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
104 ACA § 1101(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 141–42 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
105 ACA § 1101(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 142 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
106 ACA § 1101(e)(2). 
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Uninsured Individuals with a Preexisting Condition” and “in gen-
eral” requires the HHS Secretary to “establish a temporary high 
risk health insurance pool program to provide health insurance 
coverage for eligible individuals during the period beginning on the 
date on which such program is established and ending on January 
1, 2014.”107 Accordingly, all of the subsections of Section 1101, in-
cluding the anti-dumping provisions, are limited to the temporary 
high-risk pools. Second, the anti-dumping provisions themselves 
contain remedial provisions that repeatedly describe “the pro-
gram,” a clear reference to the “temporary high risk health insur-
ance pool program” introduced at the outset of the statutory provi-
sion.108 In sum, there is no plausible reading of Section 1101 under 
which its anti-dumping provisions can be understood to extend to 
the prospect of employer dumping of high-risk employees on to the 
individual markets in 2014 and beyond. 
II. EMPLOYER DUMPING STRATEGIES 
As Part I makes clear, employers generally, and particularly 
those that self-insure, have substantial legal room under ACA to 
engage in indirect risk classification. In particular, they are largely 
free to design plan benefits, provider networks, and wellness pro-
grams so that their plans disproportionately appeal to relatively 
healthy employees but are unattractive to high-risk employees. 
Moreover, self-insured employers are not subject to the risk ad-
justment mechanisms that are designed to offset any potential fi-
nancial gain that can be achieved through indirect risk classifica-
tion. This Part explores how an employer would go about designing 
and implementing a targeted dumping strategy designed to induce 
low-risk employees to retain ESI but cause high-risk employees to 
opt out of ESI in favor of coverage through an exchange. Section A 
starts with general considerations, while Section B offers specific 
examples of how an employer might structure a plan designed to 
dump high-risk employees but retain low-risk employees. 
 
107 ACA § 1101(a), 124 Stat. at 141 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
108 Id. 
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A. General Considerations in Plan Design 
1. Getting High-Risk Employees onto an Exchange 
The core purpose of an employer dumping strategy is to cause 
high-risk employees to opt out of employer coverage and seek cov-
erage on the individual insurance market, likely via an insurance 
exchange. Contrary to several different publicly available summa-
ries of health care reform,109 high-risk employees will indeed have 
the option of purchasing coverage in state-run exchanges. This is 
because ACA provides that any “qualified individual” may pur-
chase coverage through an exchange.110 A qualified individual, in 
turn, is “an individual who is seeking to enroll in a qualified health 
plan in the individual market offered through the Exchange and 
resides in the State that established the Exchange.”111 The only in-
dividuals who are explicitly excluded from the definition of quali-
 
109 These summaries suggest or affirmatively proclaim that only individuals who do 
not have access to affordable employer coverage will be eligible to purchase coverage 
via an exchange. See, e.g., Foley & Lardner LLP, Will Proposed Health Insurance 
Exchanges Work and Be Affordable? 1 (Apr. 2010), available at  
http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication=7033 (“The Exchanges will initially be 
open only to individuals who work at companies no more than 100 employees or that 
do not provide insurance, the self-employed and unemployed, non-Medicare-covered 
retirees, and small businesses.”); Kaiser Family Found., Explaining Health Care Re-
form: Questions About Health Insurance Exchanges 1 (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908-02.pdf (stating that ACA “requires most 
individuals to have health insurance beginning in 2014. It authorizes entities known as 
American Health Benefit Exchanges, which states will establish by January 1, 2014, to 
make plans available to qualified individuals and employers. Qualified individuals in-
clude U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who are not incarcerated, and who do not 
have access to affordable employer coverage.”). 
 The confusion of commentators appears to stem from several sources. First, under 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform coverage via the Connector, enrollment is indeed 
limited to those who do not have the option of affordable employer provided cover-
age. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176Q, § 1 (2006) (excluding from the definition of “eligible 
individual” anyone who is offered subsidized health insurance by an employer with 
more than fifty employees). Second, the bill that came out of the Senate Health, Edu-
cation, Labor and Pensions Committee, which largely became the blueprint for 
PPACA, did exclude individuals with access to affordable employer coverage from 
eligibility for exchange-based coverage. Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 
111th Cong. § 3116(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2009). 
110 ACA § 1311(d)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 176 (2010) (to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (“An Exchange shall make available qualified health plans 
to qualified individuals and qualified employers.”). 
111 ACA § 1312(f)(1), 124 Stat. at 183–84 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032) (in-
ternal punctuation omitted). 
MONAHANSCHWARCZ_PREPP1 2/23/2011  10:19 PM 
2011] Dumping Sick Employees 155 
fied individuals are those who are either incarcerated or not lawful 
residents of the country.112 There are no such eligibility restrictions 
placed on employees with access to employer coverage. 
Although coverage through an exchange will be available to 
high-risk employees, it will undoubtedly cost more to the employee 
than coverage under the employer’s plan. First, by electing individ-
ual coverage, employees would ordinarily lose their employers’ 
contribution to their health insurance premiums, which is often 
quite substantial.113 At the same time, they would not be eligible for 
government subsidies through an exchange so long as their em-
ployers’ plan was “affordable” and provided “minimum value.”114 
Second, employees would ordinarily need to pay the premiums for 
coverage purchased through an exchange with after-tax dollars, 
even though their premiums for ESI can be paid with pre-tax dol-
lars.115 Third, ESI may continue to enjoy certain economies of scale 
relative to coverage on the individual market.116 Finally, coverage 
on the individual market will be subject to various requirements 
that are not applicable to employer plans, resulting in a compara-
tively generous, and therefore expensive, plan.117 As such, a major 
consideration in devising an effective employer dumping strategy is 
the extent to which the employer offsets these costs of electing 
coverage in the individual market, thereby making individual cov-
erage a financially attractive option for high-risk employees. While 
some employers may not mind forcing their high-risk employees to 
choose between insufficient employer coverage or more expensive 
coverage on the exchange, others may be quite concerned about 
the labor market impacts of such a strategy. 
 
112 ACA § 1312(f), 124 Stat. at 183–84 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032). 
113 On average in 2009, workers paid only seventeen percent of the cost of single 
coverage, and twenty-seven percent of the cost for family coverage. Kaiser Family 
Found., supra note 13, at 68. The majority of workers are employed by firms that con-
tribute at least half of the premium cost. Id. at 81. 
114 ACA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 216–17 (adding § 36B(c)(1)(C) to the I.R.C.). 
115 In order to allow pre-tax payment of health insurance premiums, employers must 
establish a cafeteria plan pursuant to § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Mark 
A. Hall & Amy B. Monahan, Using Tax Sheltered Cafeteria Plans to Pay for Individ-
ual Health Insurance, 43 Inquiry 252, 256 (2010). 
116 See infra Subsection III.A.2 (explaining that exchanges will largely reduce this 
historical benefit for ESI relative to individual markets). 
117 See infra Subsection III.A.2 (arguing that high risk employees will be willing to 
pay for this increased cost of coverage on the exchange). 
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2. The Complicated Desires of Low-Risk Employees 
In order to be effective, an employer dumping strategy must 
avoid inducing substantial numbers of low-risk employees to opt 
for coverage through an exchange. After all, if the low-risk indi-
viduals leave along with the high-risk individuals, the employer 
plan will not improve its overall risk profile. Two interrelated con-
cerns might cause low-risk employees to seek coverage through an 
exchange rather than the employer plan. First, low-risk employees 
may also be quite risk averse.118 Second, low-risk employees may 
unexpectedly and quickly become high-risk employees if, for in-
stance, they are diagnosed with a disease or are the victims of acci-
dents. A low-risk but risk-averse individual will not want to enroll 
in a plan that does not adequately cover her needs in the event that 
she becomes high risk. 
These concerns suggest that an effective employer dumping 
strategy must provide reliable coverage for any medical costs that 
are not foreseeable within a year’s time of when they are incurred, 
such as an unexpected illness or accident. Under ACA, individuals 
are only eligible to purchase coverage through an exchange during 
a qualifying change in status (such as a change in employment or 
family status), or an annual open enrollment period.119 As such, an 
individual who is enrolled in her employer’s plan cannot, mid-year, 
simply elect to switch to exchange-provided coverage if she devel-
ops a health condition that enjoys better coverage in an exchange 
plan than in her employer’s plan. Such an individual would have to 
wait until the next open enrollment period to switch to exchange 
coverage, which could be up to twelve months (or as little as one 
day). At the same time, however, risk-averse, low-risk employees 
who opt for an employer plan need not be concerned about their 
coverage in the event that they suddenly expect to incur large 
medical expenses in more than a year’s time. This is because one 
year is the maximum period of time it would take an employee to 
 
118 See Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1264–74. 
119 ACA § 1311(c)(6), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 175 (2010) (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (referring to a change in status as a “special enrollment pe-
riod”). 
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acquire comprehensive coverage in an exchange at the same price 
as low-risk individuals, with no preexisting condition exclusions.120 
3. The Individual and Employer “Mandates” 
A final key consideration in designing an effective employer 
dumping strategy is ensuring that the plan successfully avoids tax 
penalties under the so-called individual and employer “mandates.” 
First, individuals may owe a tax penalty under ACA if they do not 
possess “minimum essential coverage.”121 Surprisingly, though, 
ACA appears to define employer-provided coverage as automati-
cally constituting minimum essential coverage for individuals, de-
spite the minimal requirements applicable to such plans. In particu-
lar, Section 5000A(f) of the I.R.C., as added by ACA, provides that 
minimum essential coverage includes an “eligible employer-
sponsored plan.”122 An “eligible employer-sponsored plan” is then 
defined in a way that appears to include all “group health 
plan[s].”123 Federal regulations make clear that a “group health 
plan” includes self-insured employer plans.124 In other words, even 
though self-insured employers enjoy near complete freedom in de-
termining the composition of their plans, such coverage constitutes 
“minimum essential coverage” that satisfies the individual pur-
chase mandate for covered employees. 
Similarly, the employer mandate poses minimal obstacles to an 
employer’s dumping strategy. Employers who offer a group health 
 
120 Assuming, of course, that their high risk does not stem from tobacco use. See su-
pra note 32 and accompanying text. 
121 ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(a)–(b)). 
122 ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 248–49 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(f)). 
123 Id. (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(2)). The provision provides that “[t]he 
term ‘eligible employer-sponsored plan’ means, with respect to any employee, a group 
health plan or group health insurance coverage offered by an employer to an em-
ployee which is [either] a governmental plan . . . [or] any other plan or coverage of-
fered in the small or large group market within a State.” Id. Some commentators have 
raised the prospect that this definition does not automatically mean that a “group 
health plan” is an “eligible employer-sponsored plan” because parts (A) and (B) 
modify the term “group health plan” as well as “group health insurance coverage.” 
See infra note 228. This prospect is discussed more fully infra Section III.B. 
124 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Re-
lating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,539 (June 17, 2010) (“The term ‘group 
health plan’ includes both insured and self-insured group health plans.”). 
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plan only owe a penalty under ACA when their employees receive 
subsidized coverage through an exchange. But employees are not 
eligible for subsidies if they have the option of “affordable” em-
ployer-provided coverage that provides “minimum value.”125 An 
employer plan is unaffordable for this purpose only if the em-
ployee’s required contribution for coverage exceeds 9.5% of her 
annual household income,126 which the employer can easily control 
in setting employee premium contributions. And the term “mini-
mum value” refers not to the scope of benefits offered, but to a re-
quirement that the plan pay at least sixty percent of the costs of the 
benefits that are covered by the plan.127 These thresholds are no 
more difficult for a plan to meet by virtue of the fact that it is de-
signed to appeal primarily to low-risk employees and therefore has 
significant gaps in coverage for long-term conditions. As a result, 
an employer plan designed to dump high-risk employees would 
avoid any liability under the employer mandate so long as its cov-
erage is “affordable” and provides “minimum value.” 
B. Specific Employer Dumping Strategies 
In order to successfully dump high-risk employees, employers 
must design a plan that is unappealing to high-risk employees, but 
still appealing to low-risk employees. A major obstacle in accom-
plishing the former is the fact that high-risk employees who elect 
coverage in the individual market will face higher health insurance 
costs, particularly if they thereby lose their employers’ contribution 
 
125 ACA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 216–17 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)). 
126 HCERA § 1001(a)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1031 (2010) 
(amending PPACA § 1401(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 216–17 (to be codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C))). For example, if an employee earns $21,660 per year 
(currently this is 200% of the federal poverty level, see Delayed Update of the HHS 
Poverty Guidelines for the Remainder of 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,628, 45,629 (Aug. 3, 
2010)), but is eligible for employer-provided coverage, she could receive a premium 
tax credit only if the required contribution for her employer coverage exceeds $2058 
per year (9.5% of her income). 
127 ACA § 1401(a), 124 Stat. at 217 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii)). To 
calculate this, one must subtract from the total cost of coverage the employee’s “re-
quired contribution,” which means “the portion of the annual premium which would 
be paid by the individual (without regard to whether paid through salary reduction or 
otherwise) for self-only coverage.” ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 247 (to be codified at 
I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(i)). 
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as well as the tax benefits of employer-provided coverage.128 By 
contrast, to attract low-risk employees, the employer plan likely 
must provide reliable coverage for any risks that cannot be antici-
pated a year in advance.129 Moreover, merely creating incentives 
that should produce sorting of high-risk and low-risk employees is 
not necessarily sufficient to accomplish this result—the employer 
must also convey reliable and understandable information to its 
employees about these incentives. 
Meanwhile, the employer plan must also meet various legal re-
quirements. As mentioned above, to avoid liability under the em-
ployer mandate, the employer’s coverage must both be “afford-
able” and provide “minimum value.”130 And to comport with 
ACA’s substantive requirements, the employer’s plan must (i) 
avoid any explicit discrimination on the basis of health status,131 (ii) 
provide full preventive benefits with no cost-sharing,132 (iii) impose 
no annual or lifetime limits on any essential health benefits (al-
though it need not offer essential health benefits at all),133 and (iv) 
require cost sharing of no more than approximately $6000 for indi-
viduals and $12,000 for families.134 
Clearly, an effective employer dumping strategy is not simple to 
construct. At the same time, though, this Section demonstrates 
various ways that motivated employers could thread this needle. In 
doing so, it focuses on self-insured plans, as an employer seeking to 
implement a dumping strategy would enjoy important benefits 
from self-insuring—including avoiding both state regulation and 
ACA’s risk adjustment mechanisms.135 
 
128 See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
129 See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
130 See supra Subsection II.A.3. 
131 See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
132 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 38 and 79 and accompanying text. 
 Additionally, the plan must (i) cover minimum hospital stays following child birth, 
(ii) breast reconstruction following a mastectomy, (iii) be consistent with mental 
health parity rules, and (iv) cover routine patient care costs of those participating in 
clinical trials. The first three requirements stem from ERISA, see supra notes 62–63 
and accompanying text, and the fourth from ACA, see supra note 78 and accompany-
ing text. See supra Section I.C. 
135 See supra Subsection I.B.3. 
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1. Addressing the Cost Differential 
Many, though not all, employers considering dumping high-risk 
employees will want to limit the premium differential between ESI 
and coverage available on an exchange. As noted above, exchange 
coverage is almost certain to be more expensive than employer 
coverage because, among other reasons,136 (1) employers, on aver-
age, pay the majority of employees’ health insurance premiums137 
and (2) ESI, whether paid for by the employer, employee, or some 
combination, can be paid on a pre-tax basis.138 Employers pursuing 
a dumping strategy have at least two independent reasons to limit 
(though not eliminate) this cost differential. First, they may be 
concerned about the labor market consequences of forcing their 
high-risk employees to incur these increased costs. Second, they 
may worry that high-risk employees will retain ESI simply because 
of the increased cost of coverage on an exchange. Such high-risk 
employees may generate disproportionately large costs for the em-
ployer notwithstanding the plan design.139 
In order to offset the increased cost of coverage through an ex-
change, employers could offer employees who opt out of ESI a 
payment equaling the employers’ ordinary contribution to employ-
ees’ health insurance expenses. For example, if the employer typi-
cally contributes $5000 per year for each employee covered by the 
employer’s plan, the employer would simply provide the employee 
with a direct payment of $5000 for use on an exchange. In fact, 
ACA already incorporates this concept, which it labels a “free 
 
136 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (noting that economies of scale 
and regulation may also contribute to exchange coverage being more expensive than 
ESI). This issue is addressed infra Subsection III.A.2, which argues that exchanges 
will largely eliminate the economies of scale benefits of ESI and that the increased 
costs of regulation will not deter migration by high-risks because the benefits of this 
regulation will disproportionately benefit high-risk employees. 
137 See supra note 113. 
138 See I.R.C. §§ 106, 125 (2006). In addition, as noted earlier, employees will not be 
eligible for federal premium subsidies, even if their income would otherwise qualify 
them for a subsidy, because of the fact that affordable employer coverage is available 
to them. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
139 In addition, employers may be concerned that if high-risk employees remain in 
the employer-sponsored plan, the employees’ work attendance or performance might 
suffer as the result of inadequately treated medical conditions. 
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choice voucher.”140 Indeed, ACA requires employers to offer such 
vouchers to employees when the employee’s contribution to the 
employer-sponsored plan is between 8 and 9.8 percent of the em-
ployee’s income for the taxable year and the employee would be 
eligible for subsidies through an exchange.141 Employers seeking to 
dump high-risk employees could simply make such free choice 
vouchers available to all employees who opt to purchase coverage 
on an exchange rather than through their employer.142 
An employer could ensure that these free choice vouchers would 
be tax free to employees by establishing a “health reimbursement 
arrangement” (“HRA”).143 The HRA would provide each partici-
pating employee with a set contribution each year, which the em-
ployee could then apply to the purchase of individual health insur-
ance in an exchange. The amount an employee received under the 
HRA would be excluded from her taxable income provided that 
the arrangement is solely employer-funded, reimburses the em-
ployee for qualifying medical expenses, is not made available to an 
employee for any other purpose, and the employee could not elect 
at any time to receive a distribution of the amount in cash.144 For 
purposes of an HRA, health insurance premiums are qualifying 
medical expenses.145 An employer could even set up a debit card 
program related to the account so that the employees would not 
 
140 ACA § 10108, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 912 (2010) (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18101). Note that the term “free choice voucher” is used in ACA to refer to 
a specific requirement that employers provide employees within certain income limits 
who face certain contribution requirements for an employer’s plan with a “free choice 
voucher” to help fund exchange-based individual insurance purchases. Id. What we 
propose is not within the statute’s provisions for “free choice vouchers,” but follows 
the same general principles. 
141 Id. 
142 Ideally, employers looking to dump high-risk employees on to exchanges would 
offer supplemental payments only to high-risk employees for making this switch. 
Thus, an employer might offer the supplemental payment to any employee who in-
curred more than $50,000 in medical costs in the past year. However, this type of plan 
design would almost certainly violate HIPAA, as well as ACA’s own nondiscrimina-
tion provisions. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
143 Under § 10108 of ACA, free choice vouchers to qualifying employees do not 
count as taxable income. ACA § 10108, 124 Stat. at 913 (adding § 139D to the I.R.C.). 
But the free choice vouchers described here would be paid to non-qualifying employ-
ees, and so would count as taxable income. As a result, the use of an HRA would be 
necessary to provide the amount tax-free to the employee. 
144 I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93. 
145 Id. 
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have to pay the premiums themselves and then seek reimburse-
ment, in order to relieve any cash flow problems that might result 
from such an arrangement.146 By utilizing an HRA, the employer 
could equalize the tax treatment of employer payments for group 
health plan participants and those who are being dumped. 
Free choice vouchers provided through an HRA will mitigate, 
but not eliminate, the differential in cost between employer-
provided coverage and coverage through an exchange. Employees 
who seek coverage on the individual market would still face a tax 
disadvantage because they could not pay their share of the pre-
mium with tax-free dollars.147 An employer could potentially “gross 
up” such employees, however, in order to compensate them for the 
loss of tax benefits.148 Unlike simply providing an HRA contribu-
tion that is equal to the amount the employer pays for employee 
coverage under the employer’s plan, such gross-ups would produce 
entirely new costs to an employer when an employee opts for cov-
erage through an exchange.149 In many cases, though, a gross-up 
will not be necessary: most high-risk individuals will presumably be 
willing to incur an additional tax cost in order to acquire substan-
tially more generous coverage. 
One additional consideration is that premiums for coverage 
within an exchange may be higher than premiums for the em-
 
146 See Rev. Rul. 2003-43, 2003-1 C.B. 935, 937. 
147 For example, if the employee’s share of the premium is $1000 per year, and the 
employee faces a combined federal income, state income, and payroll tax rate of 
thirty percent, paying the premium on an after-tax basis would cost the employee 
$300 more per year than paying on a pre-tax basis through an employer’s cafeteria 
plan. While an employer can, in some circumstances, establish a cafeteria plan under 
§ 125 of the I.R.C. that allows employees to set aside pre-tax money to pay for indi-
vidual health insurance policies, ACA specifically prohibits the pre-tax payment of 
the employee’s portion of individual health insurance premiums in most instances. 
See ACA § 1515, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 258 (2010) (to be codified at 
I.R.C. § 125(f)(3)) (excluding payments to exchange-participating health plans from 
the gross income exemption given to qualified benefits). 
148 The gross-up could be accomplished either by paying the employee additional 
cash compensation, or by increasing the amount of the contribution to the HRA, in 
an amount equal to the increased tax cost. Increasing the HRA contribution would be 
a cheaper option for the employer because it would be tax-free, but there might be 
problems under applicable nondiscrimination rules if the amount of the contributions 
were greater for higher-income employees. 
149 The actual cost to an employer would vary significantly based on the income lev-
els of its employees. 
MONAHANSCHWARCZ_PREPP1 2/23/2011  10:19 PM 
2011] Dumping Sick Employees 163 
ployer-provided plan precisely because the coverage in the ex-
change will be more generous. As above, an employer concerned 
that this cost difference will discourage migration by high-risk em-
ployees can cover this price differential between employer cover-
age and exchange coverage by increasing the size of its HRA con-
tribution. But in many cases, incurring this cost may not be 
necessary to induce high-risk employees to opt for exchange cover-
age, assuming that an exchange plan is substantially more valuable 
to the high-risk employee than the employer plan. Moreover, mak-
ing the employer’s contribution to the HRA more generous than 
the employer’s contribution to its own coverage carries with it the 
risk that low-risk employees will also opt to receive the HRA con-
tribution and purchase individual policies. 
In sum, employers can incorporate into their plans various 
measures that substantially mitigate the cost difference to employ-
ees of purchasing coverage in an exchange rather than purchasing 
employer-provided coverage. These efforts may come with an in-
creased cost if the employer chooses to gross up the employee’s 
premium payment or increase employer contributions.  Employers 
who feel compelled to protect high-risk employees in this way will 
only find a dumping strategy attractive if these costs are out-
weighed by cost savings generated by targeted dumping.  But if the 
plan design is successful at sorting risks, very significant cost sav-
ings from targeted dumping can be achieved.150 
2. Benefit and Cost-Sharing Structure 
An employer seeking to dump high-risk employees on to an in-
surance exchange must also carefully design its benefits and cost-
sharing structures to appeal to low-risk employees but not to high-
risk employees. To accomplish the former, the plan should provide 
generous benefits with no cost sharing for all medical expenses that 
a relatively healthy person might incur. ACA already requires full 
 
150 As an extreme example, take the statistic that three-quarters of all medical ex-
penditures are incurred by individuals with chronic conditions. Catherine Hoffman et 
al., Persons with Chronic Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 
1477 (1996). If an employer could successfully encourage all of its employees with 
chronic conditions to opt for coverage in the individual market instead of the group 
plan, the employer’s group plan could theoretically reduce its costs by seventy-five 
percent. See infra Subsection III.A.2.c. 
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coverage for preventive services,151 but an employer might also 
provide full coverage with no cost sharing for services such as der-
matology visits, wellness screenings, sports medicine related treat-
ments, and optometry expenses. 
As discussed above, the more difficult, and more important, 
component of designing an employer dumping plan is to make the 
plan unattractive to high-risk insureds without scaring off low-risk, 
but risk-averse, policyholders. Recall that participants in an em-
ployer’s plan may need to wait up to twelve months to switch into 
an individual plan in an exchange given the annual open enroll-
ment period in exchanges.152 As such, a plan design that provided 
inadequate coverage for acute episodes would likely cause low-
risk, but risk-averse, individuals to opt for coverage in an exchange, 
especially if such coverage were subsidized by the employer as de-
scribed above. Employers who either increase their contribution or 
gross up employee premium payments for those who participate in 
an exchange will need to minimize the number of non-high-risk 
employees who opt for exchange coverage in order to minimize 
those increased costs. As such, their plans must provide adequate 
coverage for acute health care expenses as well as for the initial 
stages of illnesses, but nonetheless provide quite limited care for 
large expenses that can be anticipated a year or more before they 
are incurred. 
One way to meet these specifications is for the employer plan to 
include maximal levels of cost-sharing requirements for all medical 
services and drugs that are associated with chronic conditions.153 
Thus, the plan could require up to a $6000 deductible ($12,000 for 
families)154 with respect to hospitalization, surgery, drugs used for 
chronic conditions, and durable medical equipment. The precise 
 
151 ACA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 131–32 (adding § 2713 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13). 
152 ACA § 1311(c)(6), 124 Stat. at 175 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). Indi-
viduals who participate in their employer’s medical plan through a cafeteria plan (i.e., 
individuals who pay premiums of a pre-tax basis) would not be permitted to drop em-
ployer coverage mid-year absent a qualifying change of status. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-4 
(2010). Having to pay for the employer plan when it is no longer useful is, however, a 
less significant issue than potentially not being able to obtain coverage on the ex-
change. 
153 Recall that ACA does cap cost-sharing requirements even for self-insured plans. 
See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra note 134. 
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amount of the deductible would likely vary depending on the em-
ployee population’s average income level. From the perspective of 
a high-risk individual, of course, these cost-sharing arrangements 
would be quite burdensome, particularly because they would be in-
curred year after year. At the same time, though, these cost-sharing 
arrangements can be designed so that they do not cause low-risk, 
but risk-averse, policyholders to opt for coverage in an exchange. 
This is because the maximum amount they would owe is capped, 
the likelihood of owing that amount is low (by assumption), and 
they will always be free to opt for coverage through an exchange in 
no more than a year if their risk level changes. 
A second approach to designing an employer plan to produce 
dumping of high-risk employees is simply to exclude altogether 
care and drugs for conditions that can in most circumstances be 
readily anticipated. There are numerous illnesses and diseases 
wherein there is a substantial gap in time between diagnosis and 
the need for extensive medical treatment.155 And the list of diseases 
that can be anticipated with a high degree of accuracy is only grow-
ing: for instance, recent reports preliminarily suggest that Alz-
heimer’s can be predictably diagnosed well before its onset.156 
Moreover, some genetic conditions, such as Huntington’s dis-
ease, hemophilia, and cystic fibrosis, can be identified at the time 
of one’s birth or shortly thereafter.157 For these genetic diseases, 
there would be limited risk that individual employees would not 
expect a large likelihood of medical expenses, and so treatment 
 
155 This is true for many degenerative diseases, such as Huntington’s disease. Caro-
lyn Jacobs Chachkin, What Potent Blood: Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis 
and the Transformation of Modern Prenatal Care, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 9, 42–43 
(2007). 
156 See Gina Kolata, In Spinal Test, Early Warning on Alzheimer’s, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 10, 2010, at A1. 
157 Chachkin, supra note 155. Neither the ADA nor the Genetic Information Non-
discrimination Act (“GINA”) would prohibit such an exclusion. Under the ADA, 
such exclusions are permissible provided they are justified on the basis of cost, see su-
pra notes 83–85 and accompanying text, and GINA imposes no requirements on 
health plans to cover genetically based diseases or illnesses. See Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b)) (adding § 1182(b) to 
ERISA and adding § 300gg-1(b) to the PHSA) (mandating that a health plan may not 
adjust premiums or contributions on the basis of genetic information but making no 
coverage requirement for genetically based diseases).  
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and therapies for such conditions could be excluded from the em-
ployer’s plan. There would be greater risk in excluding coverage 
for genetic diseases that might not become known until later in life. 
However, a plan could mitigate this risk by providing (but not re-
quiring)158 full coverage for genetic testing for such diseases, which 
would theoretically allow individuals to learn their status and 
switch to exchange-based coverage before treatment is necessary. 
Ultimately, though, given that there are many circumstances under 
which an individual may not know that she is a carrier of a gene for 
an excluded disease, careful thought would need to be given re-
garding exactly which genetic conditions to exclude and under 
what circumstances.159 
Yet a third approach for an employer seeking to dump high-risk 
individuals while not scaring off risk-averse, low-risk individuals is 
to exclude coverage for care or drugs that can easily be postponed 
or that is usually only necessary in the later stages of chronic dis-
eases or conditions. For instance, it might be possible to exclude 
coverage for certain organ transplants that are only necessary after 
a prolonged disease. Similarly, an employer plan might cover the 
diagnosis of chronic conditions such as autism but specifically ex-
clude long-term treatment via behavioral therapy. Yet another ex-
ample is that the plan might exclude gastric-bypass surgery and 
other forms of treatment that are considered only after a disease 
has significantly advanced.160 
 
158 Any such requirement would violate GINA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2006). 
159 For example, a plan that excluded coverage for cystic fibrosis treatment might 
result in significant hardship for families that have a child unexpectedly born with cys-
tic fibrosis. Because the cystic fibrosis gene is recessive, it is entirely possible that two 
individuals are unaware of their status as gene carriers and therefore are unaware of 
the risk to their children. See Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 
http://www.cff.org/AboutCF/Testing/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). A plan could poten-
tially counteract this risk through coverage of genetic testing (in this case for potential 
parents), but it is an incomplete solution. In any event, the topic of genetics and in-
surance has produced a substantial literature. See, e.g., Susan Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, 
Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, Sup-
plement, 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 6 (Summer 2007). Our goal here is simply to raise the 
possibility that employers might exploit the time gap between diagnosis and medical 
treatment that accompanies some genetic conditions in designing a dumping strategy. 
160 See National Institutes of Health, The Practical Guide: Identification, Evaluation, 
and Treatment of Overweight and Obesity in Adults 38 (Oct. 2000), available at 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/prctgd_c.pdf. 
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Employers who are less sensitive to the labor market conse-
quences of changing their health plan (that is, the potential that the 
employer will become less able to compete for desired employees) 
may be willing to employ a more aggressive dumping strategy. In 
particular, they may offer employees only the option of a health re-
imbursement arrangement funded with an amount equal to the 
employer’s typical employee contribution to the group health plan 
and design their plans with larger gaps in coverage that may indeed 
scare away some risk-averse employees. For instance, such em-
ployers may refuse to cover various essential health benefits at all, 
such as hospitalization, non-preventive lab and blood work, or 
pharmacy costs. Taking this approach will likely cause many of 
their low-risk, but risk-averse, employees to opt out of employee 
coverage. But this prospect is much less troubling to an employer 
who chooses not to absorb any increased costs such as a higher 
employer contribution of premium gross-ups. And so long as the 
group of workers who migrate to an exchange are less healthy on 
average than those who do not, the employer will come out ahead 
if the labor market consequences of that decision are not signifi-
cant. 
Ultimately, motivated employers will enjoy tremendous discre-
tion in seeking to develop a specific benefit plan that carves out 
expensive, long-term treatments and conditions without jeopardiz-
ing the financial security or health of low-risk individuals who un-
expectedly develop medical needs during the year. Indeed, em-
ployers will have several years, copious data, and various 
sophisticated intermediaries studying this issue to help them de-
velop such plans, if they so desire. 
3. Limited Provider Networks 
Another important facet of plan design that is available to an 
employer seeking to dump high-risk employees is its provider net-
work. In contrast to the limitations placed on plan benefits and cost 
sharing, ACA imposes virtually no restrictions on an employer’s 
network of providers.161 Consequently, motivated employers will 
have substantial freedom to select providers who appeal to low-risk 
employees but not to high-risk employees. Once again, there are 
 
161 See supra Subsection I.C.3.b. 
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multiple different ways in which an employer could accomplish 
this. Perhaps the best option is for the employer to maintain a 
wide-open network of primary care doctors and other providers 
who do not specialize in treating those with chronic conditions. It 
might contract with providers with short wait times, attractive of-
fices, and strong customer service, or even with concierge-type 
practices.162 At the same time, it could maintain a tightly controlled 
network of providers when it comes to surgeons, oncologists, 
nephrologists, and other types of specialists. Irrespective of 
whether such a provider network would be beneficial in the ab-
stract—and there is good reason to believe that it might be, given 
the imbalance of primary care doctors and specialists in this coun-
try163—it would help an employer generate indirect risk classifica-
tion because choice among primary care doctors is comparatively 
valuable to low-risk employees, while choice among specialists is 
comparatively valuable to high-risk employees. 
It is possible that risk-averse employees might be driven to pur-
chase coverage in an exchange by a restricted network of specialist 
doctors, given the risk that they might become high-risk and need 
to wait up to twelve months to switch into an exchange plan. If so, 
the employer can simply place large cost-sharing requirements on 
provider visits outside of the network. However, because ACA im-
poses aggregate cost-sharing limits even on self-insured plans,164 
and cost-sharing limits may be an important facet of benefit design 
as described above, the employer instead simply might make it in-
convenient and difficult to see out-of-network providers. For in-
stance, it might require pre-approval from a primary care physi-
cian, or it might insist upon a referral from its own in-network 
specialist. It might also place a cap on the number of times a poli-
cyholder can permissibly see an out-of-network specialist.165 
 
162 Cf. Kevin Sack, Despite Recession, Personalized Health Care Remains in De-
mand, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2009, at A12 (discussing benefits of concierge medicine). 
163 Harry A. Sultz & Kristina M. Young, Health Care USA: Understanding Its Or-
ganization and Delivery 194 (6th ed. 2009). 
164 Supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
165 It is conceivable (but unlikely) that such a cap could be characterized as an ag-
gregate or lifetime limit. 
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4. Wellness Programs 
Employers seeking to induce high-risk employees to purchase 
coverage through an exchange will have various opportunities to 
exploit wellness programs to reduce the cost of coverage for low-
risk employees (and, correspondingly, to increase it for high-risk 
employees).166 Recall that ACA permits two types of employer 
wellness programs.167 First, it permits all programs that are not tied 
to meeting a standard related to health status.168 Although not spe-
cifically tied to health status, these types of programs may be dis-
proportionately utilized by employees who are relatively low risk 
and thus help facilitate indirect risk classification. For instance, 
gym memberships are likely to be utilized more by relatively 
healthy employees. As a result, a wellness program that offers 
premium discounts for gym usage may disproportionately appeal 
to low-risk employees. 
Second, ACA also permits, under more limited conditions, well-
ness programs that provide rewards for satisfying a standard that is 
related to health status.169 The prospect that employers might ex-
ploit these types of programs to differentially benefit low-risk em-
ployees is self-evident. An employer might, for example, offer a 
wellness reward for obtaining a cholesterol level below average, or 
for maintaining a healthy weight. ACA does explicitly attempt to 
limit this risk, prohibiting the usage of wellness programs tied to 
health factors when they are “a subterfuge for discriminating based 
on a health status factor.”170 But this provision is unlikely to be ef-
fective, as it seems almost impossible to apply in practice. The core 
problem is that in order to incentivize healthy living, a wellness 
program must provide benefits only to those who are, in fact, 
healthier. Thus, while there is certainly a risk of liability under 
 
166 For a discussion of the role of wellness programs in health care reform, see gen-
erally Mariner, supra note 90. 
167 See supra Subsection I.C.3.c. 
168 ACA § 1201, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 156–57 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (adding § 2705(j) to the PHSA). 
169 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–59 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (adding 
§ 2705(j) to the PHSA). 
170 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 158 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (adding 
§ 2705 to the PHSA). 
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ACA to an employer that seeks to implement a wellness program 
based on health related status, this risk ultimately seems limited. 
5. Employer-Provided Information and Employee “Free Choice” 
All of the explicit design features described above can provide 
strong incentives for high-risk employees to opt for coverage in an 
exchange and for low-risk employees to stick with employer-
sponsored coverage. But incentives are imperfect drivers of human 
behavior, especially when people have limited information about 
the circumstances that create these incentives or a limited capacity 
to make decisions on the basis of their self-interest.171 
For these reasons, an employer dumping strategy is only likely to 
be successful if employees of dumping employers have good infor-
mation and advice about the decision whether to retain employer-
sponsored coverage or to opt for coverage in an exchange. The 
best way to accomplish this is to provide employees with the coun-
sel of a learned intermediary incentivized to offer advice consistent 
with employees’ best interests.172 
Dumping employers are ideally suited to provide their employ-
ees with precisely such counsel. Most importantly, the incentives of 
dumping employers and their employees are aligned: both benefit 
when employees select employer-sponsored coverage if they are 
relatively healthy but select coverage on an exchange if they are 
less healthy. Second, employers typically already have extensive 
resources in place for informing their employees about their bene-
fit options. Third, employees expect to make important benefits 
decisions when they begin employment, have the capacity to seek 
advice from similarly-situated co-workers, and often have time to 
devote to this choice when they begin a new job. Although this 
 
171 For general discussions of the problems that individuals may have making health 
care decisions consistent with their own self-interest, see Carl E. Schneider & Mark 
A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 7 
(2009). 
172 See Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” 
in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 Conn. Ins. L.J. 723, 745–48 (2009) (emphasizing 
the importance of aligning the incentives of agents and the consumers they advise); 
Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection 4 (N.Y.U. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10–33, July 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640624 (discussing the important role that information in-
termediaries can play in overcoming market problems). 
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may be less true for current employees during open enrollment pe-
riods, employers seeking to dump high-risk employees could priori-
tize informing and counseling employees on a yearly basis, during 
each open enrollment period. 
On top of this informational campaign, dumping employers 
could place subtle, informal pressure on their high-risk employees 
to avail themselves of the option to purchase coverage on an ex-
change. In particular, they could explain that the employee plan 
provides the best coverage around when it comes to routine care 
and episodic emergency care. At the same time, the employer 
could explain that the plan is not suitable for those with chronic or 
persistent conditions and, for that reason, it subsidizes the costs of 
purchasing individual coverage. Moreover, the employer might go 
so far as to explain to employees that it is in their collective self-
interest for those with chronic or persistent conditions to opt for 
coverage through an exchange. Doing so does not cost high-risk 
employees substantially more that they would otherwise pay, pro-
vides them with more appropriate coverage, and helps keep costs 
low and salaries high. 
None of this information, advising, and informal messaging 
would violate either ACA itself or pre-ACA law. In explaining the 
relative costs and benefits of employer provided coverage and cov-
erage through the exchanges, the employer is not in any way dis-
criminating among its employees. Rather, the employer is simply 
presenting employees with relevant information about an impor-
tant choice. As a result, explaining the reasons behind the structure 
of the employer plan and the availability of the supplemental pay-
ment should not be legally problematic. 
III. SCOPE, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 
Parts I and II laid out both the legality of employer dumping and 
the various strategies that employers might use to accomplish such 
dumping. This Part considers the implications of employer dump-
ing as well as various potential solutions to the problem. Section A 
begins by considering the extent to which employers will ultimately 
find a targeted dumping strategy preferable to either dropping 
coverage altogether or maintaining relatively comprehensive cov-
erage. Although predicting employer behavior is an inherently 
speculative enterprise, it argues that there is a substantial risk that 
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many employers will be drawn to some version of the dumping 
strategies described in Part II. It argues that such wide-spread em-
ployer dumping of high-risk employees could imperil the future of 
health care reform by undermining the sustainability of individual 
insurance markets and insurance exchanges. 
Section B concludes by exploring both regulatory and statutory 
solutions to the problem of targeted employer dumping. It suggests 
that several regulatory approaches—including changing the regula-
tions governing the ADA, revising administrative rulings on health 
reimbursement arrangements, or interpreting ACA to provide that 
self-insured plans do not automatically constitute “eligible em-
ployer plans”—could substantially limit the availability and attrac-
tiveness of an employer dumping strategy. Unfortunately, each of 
these approaches would likely have far wider implications that 
could not be cabined to the risk of employer dumping. By contrast, 
several relatively straightforward statutory changes could virtually 
eliminate the risk of employer dumping in a fairly targeted fashion. 
A. Implications and the Magnitude of Employers’ 
 Incentives to Dump 
Any amount of employer dumping of high-risk employees poses 
a public policy problem for health insurance reform. Employers 
who dump high-risk employees strike directly at the spirit of health 
care reform, which embraces social solidarity in the sharing of 
medical risks.173 Irrespective of whether one sympathizes with this 
goal, it is clearly problematic to allow some people (dumping em-
ployers and their employees) to escape this obligation, while forc-
ing the remainder of the population to contribute to social health 
care costs. Not only is employer dumping of high-risk employees 
fundamentally unfair, but it risks undermining the willingness of 
the general population to embrace the notion that all must con-
tribute their fair share to paying for our country’s sick population. 
Indeed, a robust literature suggests that people’s willingness to co-
operate with legal rules that require sacrifice crucially depends on 
the degree to which they perceive others to do the same.174 In other 
 
173 See generally Mariner, supra note 90. 
174 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 591, 604 (1996) (“Empirical studies show that the willingness of persons to obey 
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words, to the extent that some actors are perceived to “cheat” the 
system, others are less likely to play by the rules themselves. 
Unfortunately, the risks associated with employer dumping of 
high-risk employees are not limited to unfairness or counterpro-
ductive norm-development. Much to the contrary, such employer 
dumping also jeopardizes the economic viability of health care re-
form writ large by threatening the individual insurance markets 
and exchanges that ACA establishes to organize these markets.175 If 
employers dump a substantial number of disproportionately high-
risk employees on to individual markets, then premiums for all 
policyholders will rise to reflect the worse-than-average risk pool. 
Such adverse selection would not only increase premiums, but 
would decrease coverage rates by making coverage unattractive to 
low-risk policyholders. Notably, it would also promote adverse se-
lection for a less conventional reason: higher prices would exempt 
a greater number of people from the individual mandate.176 This, in 
turn, would free these individuals to purchase comprehensive 
health insurance only once they became sick. Individuals would not 
bear the burden of the resulting rate increases alone: so too would 
the federal government, whose statutory obligations to subsidize 
health insurance premiums increase in lock step with increases in 
overall premiums.177 
Such adverse selection on insurance exchanges is problematic 
even if one disputes the premise that employers and their low-risk 
employees ought to pay the health care costs of high-risk individu-
als. First, adverse selection does not simply move costs away from 
 
various laws is endogenous to their beliefs about whether others view the law as wor-
thy of obedience: if compliance is perceived to be widespread, persons generally de-
sire to obey; but if they believe that disobedience is rampant, their commitment to 
following the law diminishes. Even a strong propensity to obey the law, in other 
words, can be undercut by a person’s ‘desire not to be suckered.’” (internal citations 
omitted)); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2181, 2185 (1996) (“At some point, when everyone else is violating a 
norm . . . obeying the norm makes one a ‘chump.’”). 
175 See supra Subsection I.B.2.b. 
176 ACA does not subject individuals to any penalties for failing to secure health in-
surance coverage if the individual’s “required contribution . . . for cover-
age . . . exceeds 8 percent of such individual’s household income.” ACA § 1501, Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 246–47 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A). 
177 ACA §§ 1401–02, 124 Stat. at 213-24 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36 and 42 U.S.C. 
§18071).  
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these parties. Instead, it reallocates these costs to other parties—
the individuals who purchase coverage on exchanges.178 This group 
is particularly likely to be low income in the aggregate, both be-
cause subsidies are available for low-income individuals in ex-
changes and because they will disproportionately not have the op-
tion of employer-sponsored coverage. Second, as described above, 
adverse selection on insurance exchanges threatens the exchanges’ 
long-term viability. Even critics of reform are likely to support ef-
fective insurance exchanges, which are fundamentally aimed at 
promoting a more transparent marketplace for individuals to pur-
chase insurance. 
These risks are different in kind than those associated with the 
risk that employers will drop coverage altogether. Most impor-
tantly, even if a large number of employers dropped coverage alto-
gether, this would not undermine the sustainability of exchanges or 
the individual market more generally, as employers have heteroge-
neous populations with respect to health risks. As a result, an em-
ployer who dropped coverage altogether would dump employees 
of all risk levels into the individual market, which would not skew 
the risk profile of the individual market. Second, large employers 
who dropped coverage entirely would potentially owe tax penalties 
under the “employer mandate,”179 meaning that it is not likely that 
they would undermine social norms consistent with compliance 
with health care reform. 
The magnitude of both the norm development and adverse se-
lection threats depends entirely on the prevalence of targeted em-
ployer dumping of high-risk employees. If only a few relatively 
small employers utilize this dumping strategy, then the amount of 
adverse selection that will result will likely be trivial. And while 
sporadic dumping by a few small employers might impact the atti-
tude of some regarding health care reform, it would be unlikely to 
dramatically influence the willingness of the population at large to 
comply with the individual mandate. By contrast, if a dumping 
strategy becomes prevalent among large employers, then the re-
sulting adverse selection would be catastrophic. The remainder of 
 
178 The costs associated with dumping are also indirectly reallocated to the federal 
government, which must pay a greater amount in premium tax credits as premiums 
rise. 
179 See supra Subsection II.A.3. 
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this Section therefore analyzes how prevalent dumping of high-risk 
employees is likely to be among employers and which employers 
are most likely to be attracted to such a strategy. Although predict-
ing the future is always a dangerous enterprise, this Section argues 
that there is a real risk that employers generally, and large employ-
ers in particular, are likely to find a dumping strategy appealing in 
2014. 
1. Employers’ Pre-ACA Incentive to Offer Generous Coverage 
Historically, employers have had strong incentives to design ro-
bust health insurance plans that provide generous coverage to all 
of their employees. In large part, this is because ESI has tradition-
ally enjoyed several economic advantages over individual insur-
ance coverage. First, employers hire employees for reasons unre-
lated to health insurance, so the insured group tends to enjoy a 
near community-level risk profile. In other words, employees’ 
health risks generally mirror the community at large, especially for 
large employers, creating a natural risk-pooling mechanism. Sec-
ond, because of the administrative efficiencies associated with 
group purchase, administrative costs have historically been sub-
stantially lower for ESI than coverage available in individual mar-
kets.180 As with the benefits associated with risk pooling, large em-
ployers disproportionately benefit from such economies of scale. 
Third, from an employee’s perspective, the employer also provides 
valuable “informational intermediation” by performing the health 
insurance search and aggregation functions, reducing the health in-
surance decision-making costs that employees face.181 
As described earlier, the federal tax code further reinforced the 
tendency of employers to offer generous coverage.182 Both em-
ployer and employee contributions toward ESI can be excluded 
 
180 Estimates suggest that group plans spend less than ten percent of premiums on 
administrative costs, while such costs are equal to thirty to forty percent of premiums 
in the individual market. Mark Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health In-
surance: Weighing the Pros and Cons, 18 Health Aff. 28, 33–34 (1999); Mark V. Pauly 
& Len M. Nichols, The Nongroup Health Insurance Market: Short on Facts, Long on 
Opinions and Policy Disputes, Health Aff. – Web Exclusive W325, W326 (Oct. 23, 
2002), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.325v1. 
181 See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, 2 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 23, 30 (2001). 
182 See supra Subsection I.C.1. 
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from federal income and payroll taxes. The tax exemption makes 
such benefits more valuable than an equal amount of cash compen-
sation (which of course is taxable), and this has led employers to 
offer plans with generous benefits and low out-of-pocket pay-
ments.183 As a result, ESI effectively enjoys a federal subsidy, which 
is not generally available for individual insurance purchases.184 By 
lowering the cost of coverage, this subsidy also encourages low-risk 
individuals to accept coverage in group plans that they might oth-
erwise find too generous relative to its price. The subsidy thus 
helps to ensure that such plans do not suffer from adverse selec-
tion. Additionally, this subsidy often leads employers to contribute 
significantly to the cost of coverage, as doing so essentially consti-
tutes a vehicle for paying salary that is not taxable.185 This further 
encourages low-risk employees to join employer plans. 
These economic and tax benefits of ESI contrast sharply with the 
coverage that has historically been available to employees who 
purchase coverage in the individual market. Indeed, one of the 
primary motivations for federal health care reform was the near-
consensus view that individual health insurance markets have tra-
ditionally been dysfunctional. Not only did these markets typically 
fail to offer affordable protection to those with poor health history 
or risks, but they subjected even healthy individuals to significant 
risks associated with unanticipated coverage restrictions, rescis-
sions, non-renewals, large rate increases, and preexisting condition 
exclusions.186 In other words, without the option of comprehensive 
ESI, high-risk employees historically found coverage to be largely 
unavailable or exorbitantly priced, and even low-risk employees 
were subject to substantial risk. 
For these reasons, employers who offered limited coverage in 
the pre-ACA world would risk experiencing substantial labor mar-
 
183 See Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care 
Policy, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 777, 785 (2006). 
184 Only self-employed individuals may deduct the cost of individual health insur-
ance purchases. See I.R.C. § 162(l) (2006). 
185 On average, workers pay only seventeen percent of the cost of single coverage, 
and twenty-seven percent of the cost for family coverage. Kaiser Family Found., supra 
note 13, at 68. The majority of workers are employed by firms that contribute at least 
half of the premium cost. Id. at 81. 
186 See Abraham & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 10–26. 
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ket costs.187 First, a plan with limited coverage would expose all 
employees to substantial risks associated with the prospect of be-
coming sick in the future. In the pre-ACA world, once a person 
became sick, his options for coverage changed dramatically. Sec-
ond, the employees who are most likely to be high risk are also 
likely to be disproportionately senior—precisely those that may be 
most valuable to an organization. In competing for senior talent, 
employers would be unlikely to take action that puts them at a dis-
advantage compared to their competitors. Consistent with these 
arguments, there is little indication that employers are currently, or 
have in the past, designed their plans to discourage enrollment by 
high-risk employees.188 
2. Employers’ Incentive to Dump in the Post-ACA World 
Starting in 2014, when most of ACA’s key provisions become ef-
fective, employers’ incentives will shift dramatically. Many em-
ployers in the post-ACA world are likely to have an incentive to 
dump high-risk employees in the ways described in Part II. As Sub-
sections a and b show, such targeted dumping would not negatively 
 
187 Of course, policyholders often have difficulty assessing the quality of their cover-
age. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance 
Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1707, 
1733–38 (2010); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regu-
lation of Insurance Policies, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1389, 1412–21 (2007). But em-
ployees may enjoy various comparative advantages in assessing the quality of their 
employer-provided coverage over policyholders in individual markets. In particular, 
they interact with other policyholders (i.e., co-workers) on a consistent basis and 
therefore may often be quite familiar with those policyholders’ insurance experiences. 
However, such advantages may be undercut somewhat by frequent carrier and plan 
design changes made by employers. Moreover, there are potentially significant mar-
ket problems even with respect to employer provided insurance. See generally Russell 
Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete 
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 27–62 
(1999). 
188 Most evidence indicates that employers do sometimes adopt plan designs that 
force high-risk employees to pay more for health care on an out-of-pocket basis, but 
we were unable to locate any studies indicating that plans were designed to discour-
age enrollment by high-risk employees. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick: 
Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Eth-
ics 453, 456–59 (2009) (describing the research on employer plans and the increased 
costs that enrollees with chronic conditions in such plans face). The lack of evidence 
of the discouragement of enrollment of high-risk employees is unsurprising, given the 
traditional unavailability of individual health insurance for high-risk individuals. 
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affect the coverage/cost mix of either low-risk or high-risk employ-
ees, and might even improve it. At the same time, as Subsection c 
demonstrates, employers could substantially decrease their health 
insurance costs by implementing a targeted dumping strategy. 
a. Targeted Dumping and Low-Risk Employees 
A dumping strategy consistent with the parameters described in 
Part II would not negatively affect either the cost or scope of cov-
erage for low-risk employees, who would retain ESI. Rather, such 
employees would experience both lower premiums and more ex-
tensive coverage for the types of services they routinely utilize, 
such as preventive, wellness, and health maintenance care. By de-
sign, they would not be subject to substantial risk: most, if not all, 
unanticipated medical costs would be covered. To the extent that 
such medical costs rendered them a high-risk rather than a low-risk 
employee, they would be covered (though perhaps with higher 
cost-sharing) until the next annual open enrollment period, when 
they could switch to coverage on their state insurance exchange. 
b. Targeted Dumping and High-Risk Employees 
More controversially, high-risk employees would also not be 
worse off if their employer chose to embrace a dumping strategy. 
As described above, coverage through an exchange will undoubt-
edly cost more to high-risk employees than coverage under a typi-
cal employer’s plan, for at least three reasons: (1) greater adminis-
trative inefficiencies, (2) less favorable tax treatment for the 
employee’s contribution to coverage, and (3) broader, more gener-
ous coverage under the exchange plan.189 Nevertheless, some of 
these cost increases are likely to be minor and all of them can be 
managed by an employer. 
Starting with the first cost driver, greater administrative ineffi-
ciencies, the comparative increase in premiums for exchange-based 
plans relative to employer plans will likely be minimal starting in 
2014. This is because many of the historical economic advantages 
enjoyed by ESI—including informational, administrative, and risk-
 
189 See supra Subsection II.A.1. It is also possible that the risk pool within an ex-
change will be worse than a typical employer’s risk pool, which would also contribute 
to increased cost for exchange-based coverage. 
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pooling benefits—will be at least partially replicated on exchanges 
starting in 2014.190 
The second cost driver is less favorable tax treatment for the 
employee’s contribution to coverage. As previously explained, em-
ployees electing coverage on an exchange would be unable to pay 
their share of premiums on a pre-tax basis.191 This has the potential 
to make such coverage significantly more expensive than even ESI 
with equal premiums. However, the actual magnitude of this pen-
alty depends on both the size of the employee’s contribution and 
the employee’s marginal tax rate. For example, an employee with a 
$2000 contribution for family coverage, whose federal and state 
combined income and payroll tax rate is forty percent, would face 
an increased cost of $800 solely because she is paying for coverage 
on the exchange. On the other hand, an employee with a $500 con-
tribution for single coverage, who has no federal and state income 
tax liability, but an eight percent payroll tax rate, would face a 
penalty of only $40. One factor that makes this increased cost 
slightly less troubling is that it is by its nature progressive. Because 
federal tax rates are themselves progressive (imposing higher rates 
on higher levels of income), higher-income individuals are likely to 
face higher tax costs than their lower-income counterparts. As with 
other increased costs, to the extent that this tax penalty discourages 
high-risk employees from switching to exchange coverage, an em-
ployer could simply increase the compensation of migrating em-
ployees, as described above.192 
Recall that the final cost driver is the generosity of exchange-
based coverage compared to ESI. While this may significantly in-
crease comparative costs, it comes with a corresponding benefit to 
the high-risk employee. The coverage costs more because it is of-
fering greater protection. This trade-off should be desirable for 
 
190 Indeed, this is the central goal of insurance exchanges. See Jost, supra note 14, at 
1. 
191 With ESI, employers can establish a cafeteria plan under § 125 of the I.R.C. to 
allow employees to pay for coverage on a pre-tax basis. See supra note 60 and accom-
panying text. ACA specifically disallows the use of cafeteria plans to pay for ex-
change-based coverage, unless the individual’s employer offers a group plan through 
the exchange. ACA § 1515, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 158 (2010) (to be codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 125). 
192 See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
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most high-risk employees, who will disproportionately benefit from 
greater coverage. 
Exchange-based coverage offers an additional benefit as well: 
choice. An employee who was being dumped would be able to se-
lect among a wide range of generous plans in her state insurance 
exchange at precisely the time when that choice is most valuable. 
Like all insurance starting in 2014, these plans will not include any 
preexisting condition exclusions or annual or lifetime caps, and will 
be tightly regulated to ensure that they provide essential health 
benefits and a robust provider network.193 Although much uncer-
tainty remains about the specific features of EHBs and exchange 
governance, these plan requirements are likely to be dispropor-
tionately valuable to high-risk individuals. Moreover, at least some 
plans in the exchange will presumably offer “platinum” level cov-
erage, which must provide “benefits that are actuarially equivalent 
to 90% of the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under 
the plan.”194 Even if insurers fail to offer platinum level coverage, 
they are required to offer at least one “gold” level plan, providing 
benefits at the eighty percent level, if they want to participate in an 
exchange.195 Additionally, some plans available through the ex-
change may have a reputation—made accessible through the vari-
ous transparency provisions applicable to exchanges196—for provid-
ing particularly good care for the specific ailment or condition 
applicable to the high-risk employee. 
Despite these benefits and employer cost mitigation, it may be 
that low-income, high-risk employees will be unwilling or unable to 
bear any significant cost increase and will therefore fail to opt-out 
of ESI. In order to combat this risk, the employer may want to 
make its contributions to HRAs tiered based on income level. For 
 
193 See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
194 ACA § 1302(d)(1)(D), 124 Stat. at 167 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022). 
While platinum level coverage is permitted to be offered within the exchange, an in-
surer is not required to offer such coverage in order to participate in the exchange. 
See ACA § 1301(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 162–63 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021) 
(providing that in order for a plan to be a “qualified health plan” the insurer issuing 
the plan must agree to offer at least one silver level plan and one gold level plan; 
there is no requirement that insurers offer platinum level coverage in order to partici-
pate in the exchange). ACA § 1302(d), 124 Stat. at 167 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18022) defines gold coverage. 
195 ACA § 1301(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 162–63 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021). 
196 See ACA § 1311(c), 124 Stat. at 174–75 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
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example, if the employer contributed $500 to the HRA of high-
income employees, it might contribute $1000 to moderate-income 
employees, and $1500 to low income employees.197 This would rec-
ognize that individuals’ ability to bear increased costs varies with 
income level and should help alleviate problems with low-income 
individuals being unwilling to switch to exchange-based coverage.198 
In the end, then, while costs may in fact be higher for high-risk em-
ployees, some of these costs come with corresponding benefits, 
others can be reduced or eliminated by an employer, and these 
costs vary based on income level. As a result, high-risk employees 
should be no worse off, and indeed are likely to be better off, un-
der a targeted dumping strategy. 
B. Targeted Dumping and Employers 
Employers that design their plans to induce dumping of high-risk 
employees would also benefit. Such employers would experience 
decreased health insurance costs. The costs of funding their em-
ployees’ health insurance should decrease dramatically to the ex-
tent that high-risk employees opt out of employer-provided cover-
age. Indeed, it is well-known that a substantial percentage of health 
care costs are attributable to a small fraction of the insured popula-
tion: two percent of the American population is responsible for 
thirty-eight percent of medical expenditures,199 and ten percent of 
the population account for sixty-nine percent of its medical costs.200 
While some of these expenses are the result of sudden and acciden-
tal events that are not predictable ex ante, many are not: indeed, 
“60–75 percent of health expenditures are associated with people 
[suffering from] chronic [medical] conditions.”201 These numbers 
 
197 The I.R.C. is concerned only with discrimination in favor of highly compensated 
employees. See I.R.C. § 105(h) (2006). There is no prohibition on discrimination in 
favor of non-highly compensated employees. 
198 See Reed Abelson, Shifting Health Costs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at B1. 
199 Thomas Rice, The Economics of Health Reconsidered 127 (2d ed. 2003). 
200 Karen Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will It Improve Health System 
Performance?, 39 Health Servs. Res. 1219, 1223 (2004) (“At the other end of the spec-
trum, . . . 50 percent of individuals account for only three percent of health care out-
lays, all with expenditures under $350 in 1997.”); see also Korobkin, supra note 187, at 
41–42. 
201 Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?, 
Health Aff. - Web Exclusive W3-237, W3-328 (May 28, 2003), http://content.health 
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suggest that even if employer dumping works imperfectly, with 
some high-risk employees retaining coverage and some low-risk 
employees purchasing coverage in an exchange, an employer can 
nevertheless generate substantial cost savings from a dumping 
strategy. 
Additionally, an employer dumping strategy should independ-
ently decrease the costs of providing health care to employees be-
cause it will contain more gaps in coverage than traditional em-
ployer plans.202 As described above, a key feature of dumping 
strategies is that they provide relatively limited coverage for those 
with long-term chronic conditions in order to induce high risks to 
opt into the individual market.203 Although the employer plan will 
likely need to be abnormally generous in other respects in order to 
retain low-risk individuals, the extent to which chronic conditions 
drive health care costs makes it clear that the cost savings from 
gaps in coverage will outweigh the increased costs of generous cov-
erage for low risks. 
The savings that a dumping strategy can generate should benefit 
not only employers who dump high-risk employees but also the 
employees themselves. All employees could benefit from the de-
creased costs to employers in health care expenses if the employer 
chose to pass along some of these savings in the form of higher 
salaries. Whether dumping employers would do that is unclear. 
Most economists agree that health care costs are simply part of 
 
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.237v1 (the figures cited include expenditures of those 
covered by both public and private insurance; as a result, those who are employed and 
have chronic conditions may have lower levels of health expenditures than those who 
are unable to work); see also Gerard Anderson & Jane Horvath, The Growing Bur-
den of Chronic Disease in America, 119 Pub. Health Rep. 263, 264 (2004) (“Analysis 
of the 1998 [medical expenditure] data shows that almost four in five health care dol-
lars (78%) are spent on behalf of people with chronic conditions. People with chronic 
conditions are the heaviest utilizers of medical care: 96% of home health, 88% of pre-
scriptions, 72% of physician visits, and 76% of inpatient hospital stays are attributed 
to people with chronic conditions . . . . Most of the utilization is by people with two or 
more chronic conditions: 80% of home health, 67% of prescriptions, 48% of physician 
visits, and 56% of inpatient stays.”); Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons with Chronic 
Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 1477 (1996) (finding that 
individuals with chronic conditions accounted for three-quarters of all medical expen-
ditures in 1987). 
202 See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
203 See supra Part II. 
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employees’ total compensation.204 Decreased health insurance costs 
may consequently tend to translate into increased salaries. At the 
same time, though, decreased costs from health insurance may not 
affect perceived employee compensation, meaning that employers 
might be free to retain these savings. 
These benefits of targeted dumping of high-risk employees are 
likely to make it a more attractive option for many employers than 
opting to simply get out of the health care business entirely.205 The 
primary benefits of dumping coverage entirely are the decreased 
costs for employers and the fact that employees with household in-
comes equal to or less than 400 percent of the federal poverty limit 
would become eligible for refundable premium tax credits.  How-
ever, for many employers and employees, a targeted dumping 
strategy will produce greater benefits than the employer dropping 
coverage altogether. First, employers with fifty or more employees 
who dropped coverage altogether might owe a substantial tax as a 
result of the employer mandate.206 By contrast, as described above, 
employers who dump high-risk employees can entirely avoid any 
tax penalty as a result so long as their coverage is “affordable” for 
all employees and provides “minimum value.”207 Second, unlike 
 
204 See Lawrence Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Health Benefits, 
Am. Econ. Rev., May 1989, at 177, 181–82.  
205 Cf. Hyman, supra note 5, at 1A11–1A17 (discussing why ACA may cause some 
employers to consider dropping group coverage entirely). 
206 See ACA § 1513, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 253–56 (2010) (to be codified 
at I.R.C. § 4980H). Employers who offer a group health plan and have at least one 
full-time employee who receives a premium tax credit would pay the lesser of $3000 
for each employee receiving a premium credit or $2000 for each full-time employee, 
excluding the first thirty employees from the assessment. HCERA § 1003, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1033 (2010) (amending PPACA § 10106(e), Pub. L. No. 111-
148 124 Stat. 119, 910 (2010) (amending PPACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253–56 (to be 
codified at I.R.C. § 4980H))). For example, if an employer with sixty employees offers 
coverage, but five employees are eligible for and receive a premium tax credit 
through the exchange, the employer would face a fee of $15,000 (the lesser of (1) the 
number of employees receiving the credit multiplied by $3000 and (2) the number of 
employees minus thirty, multiplied by $2000). A separate formula applies when an 
employer does not offer coverage and has at least one full-time employee who re-
ceives a premium tax credit. In that case, the employer faces a fee of $2000 per full-
time employee, excluding the first thirty employees from the assessment. Id. For ex-
ample, if the employer has seventy full-time employees, its penalty would be calcu-
lated by subtracting thirty from seventy, and multiplying the resulting forty by $2000, 
for a total of $80,000 per year. 
207 See supra Subsection II.A.3. 
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dropping coverage altogether, dumping effectively allows employ-
ers to increase both the compensation of its employees and its own 
profits at the expense of the public at large.208 
Nor is the attractiveness of a dumping strategy likely to substan-
tially diminish over time. Widespread and persistent dumping 
might well cause substantial adverse selection in the individual 
markets. This, in turn, might cause employers who dump to suffer 
some of the same labor market repercussions that existed prior to 
ACA. But employers would still be likely to reap a financial bene-
fit by dumping high-risk employees onto exchanges unless those 
exchanges became so swamped by adverse selection that they col-
lapsed. This is because so long as there is a minimum level of par-
ticipation in the individual market by low- and average-risk indi-
viduals, high-risk employees will be cross-subsidized by 
policyholders in the exchanges rather than other, less risky em-
ployees.209 Such minimal participation by low-risk individuals is 
likely to persist, given that the individual market will be subsidized 
through the exchanges for those with household incomes below 400 
percent of the federal poverty limit.210 
To be sure, a dumping strategy may also carry with it various 
costs. First, an employer who dumped its high-risk employees onto 
an exchange might risk reputational harm from media scrutiny. Af-
ter all, it is not uncommon for companies, particularly large com-
panies, to receive negative press regarding sub-standard health in-
surance practices.211 An employer who pursued a dumping strategy 
could be characterized as avoiding its “fair share” and harming the 
general public by dumping its high-risk employees for others to 
cross-subsidize. Second, an employer that dumped its high-risk 
employees may risk generating negative employee sentiment. This 
 
208 This gain results from the fact that employers that engage in targeted dumping 
are able to shift most of the costs associated with high-risk employees’ health care 
onto the individuals who purchase coverage on an exchange 
209 Assume, for example, that a high-risk individual has projected annual medical 
expenditures of $20,000. As long as the premiums in the individual market are below 
$20,000 (which they should be with decent participation levels by non-high-risk indi-
viduals), the employer stands to gain by dumping even if the employer pays the full 
cost associated with exchange coverage. 
210 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
211 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart’s Detractors Come in from the Cold, N.Y. 
Times, June 5, 2008, at C1. 
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may be particularly likely if some high-risk employees do not opt 
for coverage on an exchange and are then denied coverage under 
the employer plan. Even if employees do sort themselves appro-
priately, they may view their employer’s efforts to shuttle high-risk 
employees into the individual market as an indication that their 
employer does not “care” about the health burdens of its employ-
ees.212 Finally, an employer that embraced a dumping strategy 
would need to incur various administrative expenses as a result. 
These include the costs of setting up a self-insured plan, purchasing 
stop-loss insurance, administering HRA payments for high-risk 
employees, and monitoring the effectiveness of the dumping strat-
egy. 
Some of these costs could be managed by a firm that opted to 
dump high-risk employees. In particular, such employers need not 
be explicit about their strategy, and can frame their employer 
health program as one that embraces “free choice.”213 Indeed, in 
many ways this characterization is apt: the essence of an employer 
dumping strategy is to facilitate choice among employees, and then 
manipulate the options so that those employees segregate them-
selves into low-risk and high-risk pools. For this reason, it is not at 
all clear that an employer who embraced a dumping strategy could 
easily be vilified in the press or among employees. At the very 
least, it seems likely that an employer who dropped coverage alto-
gether would be a much easier target of both public outrage and 
employee dissatisfaction than an employer that cleverly but cov-
ertly embraced a dumping strategy. 
Different employers will obviously weigh these costs differently. 
Many small employers, for instance, are likely to find the adminis-
trative costs of implementing a dumping strategy to be substantial. 
 
212 There is evidence that many employers provide health care coverage because 
“[i]t is the right thing to do.” See, e.g, Paul Fronstin & Ruth Helman, Small Employ-
ers and Health Benefits: Findings from the 2002 Small Employer Health Benefits 
Survey 7 (Employee Benefit Research Inst., EBRI Issue Brief No. 253 (Jan. 2003), 
(finding that seventy-seven percent of small employers surveyed in 2002 reported “it 
is the right thing to do” as a major reason for offering a health plan). At the same 
time, employers routinely make changes that negatively impact employee health care 
coverage. See, e.g., Kaiser Family Found., supra note 13, at 186 (listing various 
changes surveyed employers would consider making to their health plan in the next 
year; for example, forty percent of respondents indicated that they were somewhat 
likely or very likely to increase the amount employees pay for copays or coinsurance). 
213 See supra Subsection II.B.5. 
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At the same time, the benefits of dumping may be reduced for 
small employers. Such employers are exempt from the employer 
mandate (if they have fewer than fifty employees). Additionally, a 
small employer’s pool of employees may not be large or diverse 
enough to make the benefits of a dumping strategy compelling. For 
example, if a small employer has twenty-five employees, all of 
whom are in excellent health with no known risk factors, dumping 
would offer no benefit. Alternatively, an employer with forty em-
ployees, four of whom are high risk, may have difficulty designing a 
dumping strategy that effectively targets those four high-risk em-
ployees. 
Large employers, by contrast, are relatively likely to be drawn to 
a dumping strategy. Most large employers already self-insure their 
group health plans,214 and therefore would not face start-up costs 
that are as high as non-self-insuring employers. Additionally, large 
employers should have an easier time successfully segregating low 
from high risks due to the size of their risk pool. These employers 
also face the greatest potential penalty under the employer man-
date if they were to simply drop employer coverage.215 
Employers with a large number of relatively unskilled employees 
are also comparatively likely to be drawn to a dumping strategy. 
Although a properly designed dumping strategy would not appre-
ciably harm employees, it might be perceived to do so. Employers 
with unskilled labor are less likely to be concerned about this pros-
pect from a labor market perspective. As described above, such 
employers might even be drawn to aggressive dumping strategies 
that transferred costs on to high-risk employees but generated en-
hanced cost savings.216 A large employer could implement a dump-
ing strategy while shielding its cadre of skilled labor from any per-
ceived downsides of a dumping strategy. For instance, it could 
retain a generous employer plan that was available only to head-
quarters staff. Doing so would potentially create problems under 
 
214 Kaiser Family Found., supra note 13, at 157 (compiling data by firm size for the 
percentage of covered workers in partially or completely self-funded plans). 
215 The penalty is $2000 per employee, except that the first thirty employees do not 
incur a penalty. See supra note 206. Therefore, while an employee with one hundred 
employees would only face a penalty of $140,000, an employer with 100,000 employ-
ees would face a penalty of $199.9 million. 
216 See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
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provisions of the I.R.C. that discourage discrimination in favor of 
highly compensated employees.217 However, differing eligibility 
provisions are permissible so long as they are based on nondis-
criminatory criteria. Distinctions based on geographic location 
would generally be considered nondiscriminatory,218 but it is un-
known whether the outcome would be different where the geo-
graphic differences distinguish between corporate and retail-level 
employees.219 Alternatively, an employer could make all plan op-
tions available to all employees, but set premium levels for the op-
tions in a way that makes it cost-prohibitive for a low wage em-
ployee to elect coverage under the generous plan. 
If a small number of employers successfully dumped their high-
risk employees onto exchanges, it is possible that many other em-
ployers would follow suit. Some of the specific details of a dumping 
strategy—such as precisely how large the HRA contribution must 
be, or exactly which types of coverage can be safely eliminated 
without harming low-risk employees—may take time to work out. 
Employers who follow the lead of others may enjoy decreased 
costs in experimenting with these variables simply by mimicking 
the efforts of others.220 Moreover, the reputational and labor mar-
ket consequences of dumping high-risk employees are likely to di-
minish to the degree that such a strategy becomes widespread. As 
 
217 See I.R.C. § 105(h) (2006). This previously applied only to self-insured plans, but 
was extended to all employer plans by ACA. ACA § 10101(d), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119, 884–85 (2010) (amending ACA § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 130–38 (2010) 
(adding § 2716 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-16)). If a self-
insured plan discriminates in favor of such employees, the highly compensated em-
ployee must include the value of coverage in her taxable income. I.R.C. § 105(h). 
218 Treas. Reg. 1.105-11(c)(2)(ii) (2010) provides that a plan satisfies the nondis-
crimination requirements with respect to eligibility where eligibility is based on a clas-
sification that the Service determines, based upon the facts and circumstances of each 
case, are nondiscriminatory. Assuming that a company’s highly and non-highly com-
pensated employees are distributed reasonably equally across geographic locations, 
setting different eligibility provisions based on employee location seems permissible 
under I.R.C. § 105(h). 
219 The Internal Revenue Service will not issue rulings regarding whether specific 
eligibility criteria are nondiscriminatory, and therefore there is very little information 
regarding which criteria are permissible and which are not. See Rev. Proc. 2010-3, 
2010-1 I.R.B. 111. 
220 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 
110 Yale L.J. 71, 77–78 (2000) (“People frequently think and do what they think and 
do because of what they think relevant others think and do.”). 
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more and more employers follow the dumping trend, a critical 
mass may be reached where the employer norm “tips” in favor of 
dumping.221 
Dumping by a few employers could produce a cascade effect for 
an additional reason. High-risk employees of a dumping employer 
may elect not to purchase coverage on an exchange, but instead to 
sign up for coverage through a spouse’s employer. This, in turn, 
could force the hand of non-dumping employers, who would them-
selves be subject to increased costs due to adverse selection from 
the spouses of dumping employers. Unless the non-dumping em-
ployer mimicked the dumping employer’s strategy, it would need 
to bear the increased costs of the dumping employer’s high-risk 
employees. 
C. Solutions 
Given the possibility that employers could structure plans to en-
courage high-risk employees to opt for individual coverage, and 
the serious consequences such strategies could have for health care 
reform generally, it is imperative for lawmakers to preemptively 
respond to the prospect of employer dumping. Although the most 
effective responses to the problem are statutory, several regulatory 
efforts may at least mitigate its scale. Notably, all of these solu-
tions, to one extent or another, increase the prospect that employ-
ers will drop coverage altogether, as they deprive employers of the 
option to selectively dump high-risk employees. But as explained 
above, the consequences of such employer decisions to drop cover-
age entirely are much less troubling than the prospect of employer 
dumping of high-risk employees.222 Moreover, at least some (and 
probably many) employers that would otherwise be attracted to a 
dumping strategy would presumably choose to retain generous 
employer coverage if the dumping option were foreclosed.223 
 
221 See id. at 82. 
222 See supra Section III.A. 
223 In the event that the dumping strategy were foreclosed, then the question of how 
employers would respond would simply implicate the familiar debate about whether 
employers will dump coverage. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (noting 
this debate). 
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1. Regulatory Solutions 
ACA delegates substantial discretion to various agencies, most 
notably HHS, to interpret and enforce its provisions. Given the 
substantial stake and responsibility that federal agencies have in 
implementing health care reform effectively, they are in an ideal 
position to counteract the prospect of employer dumping of high-
risk employees. Unfortunately, the best options for limiting the risk 
of dumping are likely “manifestly contrary to the statute.”224 None-
theless, regulators may have some discretion to, at the very least, 
make employer dumping less economically attractive. 
One potential way for regulators to limit the desirability of em-
ployer dumping is to issue regulations specifying that self-insured 
plans do not automatically constitute “eligible employer plans” 
that satisfy the individual mandate. Recall that the statute appears 
to contemplate the opposite result, providing both that (i) “eligible 
employer-sponsored coverage” constitutes “minimum essential 
coverage” and that (ii) “eligible employer-sponsored coverage” in-
cludes a “group health plan.”225 And both interim regulations, as 
well as the statute itself, make absolutely clear that a group health 
plan includes a self-insured employer plan.226 
 
224 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). The next Subsection describes various statutory fixes that would clearly pro-
hibit employer dumping. But each of these appear to be beyond the authority of regu-
lators. For example, one possible way to prevent dumping would be to subject self-
insured plans to the requirement to provide essential health benefits. Yet the statute 
is clear that the term “health plan” will not, except as specifically provided, include 
self-insured plans, ACA § 1301(b)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 163 
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021), and is similarly clear that “health insur-
ance issuer” does not apply to such plans. ACA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130–38 (adding 
§ 2715(d)(3)(A) to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15) (defining a 
health insurance issuer to include “a group health plan that is not a self-insured 
plan”). The statute is similarly clear with respect to each of the other statutory solu-
tions discussed below. 
225 See supra Subsection II.A.3 (explaining ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244–49 (to 
be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A)). 
226 See ACA § 1301(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 163 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021) (stat-
ing that “group health plan” has the meaning given to it under § 2791(a) of the PHSA, 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(a)(1) (2006), which in turn uses the definition of group health 
plan used in ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006), which clearly contemplates 
both insured and self-insured plans); Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and 
Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,539 (June 17, 
2010). 
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However, the statute actually employs the following definition: 
The term ‘eligible employer-sponsored plan’ means, with respect 
to any employee, a group health plan or group health insurance 
coverage offered by an employer to the employee which is— (A) 
a governmental plan (within the meaning of section 2791(d)(8) of 
the Public Health Service Act), or (B) any other plan or coverage 
offered in the small or large group market within a State. Such 
term shall include a grandfathered health plan described in para-
graph (1)(D) offered in a group market.227 
In contrast to the interpretation above, this provision can be 
construed such that requirements (A) and (B) modify the term 
“group health plan,” as well as the term “group health insurance 
coverage.”228 Under that construction, self-insured plans would 
never constitute an “eligible employer sponsored plan” and would 
therefore never satisfy an individual’s obligation under the so-
called individual mandate. This is because ACA defines the small 
and large group markets in a way that clearly excludes self-insured 
plans.229 
Because this interpretation is textually plausible, a court might 
be willing to defer to regulatory guidance on this issue.230 What is 
less clear is whether a court would allow HHS to use the ambiguity 
in the statute to present a third interpretation of the provision that 
is a compromise of the two extreme interpretations.231 One such 
 
227 ACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 248–49 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(2)). 
228 See Shearman & Sterling LLP, Self-Insured Medical Plans After Health Reform, 
Client Publication (Apr. 29, 2010); Church Alliance, Comments on Interim Final 
Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a 
Grandfathered Health Plan Under the PPACA 4 (Aug. 10, 2010).  
229 See ACA § 1301(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 163 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021) (stat-
ing that a “health insurance issuer” has the meaning given to it in § 2791(b) of the 
PHSA). The PHSA defines a “health insurance issuer” as follows: “[A]n insurance 
company, insurance service, or insurance organization . . . which is licensed to engage 
in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to State law which regu-
lates insurance (within the meaning of section 514(b)(2) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2))). Such term does not include a 
group health plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(b)(2) (2006). 
230 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
231 The scope of what reviewing courts consider to be permissible under Chevron 
Step II (that is, whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is reasonable) is a sub-
ject of much scholarly debate. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: 
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compromise would be to define a group health plan (and thus a 
self-insured plan) as constituting an “eligible employer-sponsored 
health plan” only if it is not designed to produce dumping of high-
risk employees. Under this reading, an employer that attempted to 
dump its high-risk employees would find that its low-risk employ-
ees would not be in compliance with the individual mandate. This, 
in turn, would largely undermine the employer’s capacity to dump 
high-risk employees by changing the labor market impact of any 
such strategy. 
A second conceivable regulatory strategy would require the In-
ternal Revenue Service to amend its rulings on health reimburse-
ment arrangements to provide that the payment of insurance pre-
miums is not an eligible expense. There is likely sufficient 
ambiguity in the relevant statutory provision to allow such an in-
terpretation.232 The Service could, for example, issue a new ruling 
stating that arrangements whereby an employer merely reimburses 
an employee for individually purchased health insurance does not 
constitute “employer-provided coverage under an accident or 
health plan.” The downside of this approach is that it would affect 
not only dumping situations, but also other situations where an 
employer has simply chosen not to sponsor a group plan and in-
stead subsidizes the purchase of individual policies. However, once 
ACA’s reforms become effective in 2014, these non-dumping uses 
of HRAs will be much less significant. Currently, employers that 
utilize HRAs are often small employers for whom the cost of spon-
soring a group health plan is prohibitive. Nevertheless, they would 
like to make a tax advantaged contribution to their employees’ 
health care expenses, and an HRA allows them to do so. Once 
ACA’s reforms become effective, those small employers can sim-
 
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 187 
(1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 
Wash. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing 
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex. 
L. Rev. 83 (1994). 
232 The Internal Revenue Code provides an exclusion from gross income for “em-
ployer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan.” I.R.C. § 106(a) (2006). 
The statute does not, however, define the relevant term. Id. Regulations simply spec-
ify that the reimbursement can be made through “insurance or otherwise” and that 
the employer can fund the arrangement either by paying premiums or by contributing 
to a separate trust or fund. Treas. Reg. 1.106-1 (2010). 
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ply elect to make exchange-based coverage available to their em-
ployees, and ACA contains provisions that allow payments for 
such coverage to be made on a pre-tax basis. Therefore, amending 
IRS guidance to prohibit the use of an HRA to reimburse individ-
ual insurance purchases may be a viable policy solution. If success-
ful, it would eliminate the ability of employers to offer contribu-
tions toward individual insurance coverage on a tax-advantaged 
basis and therefore increase the costs associated with a dumping 
strategy.233 
Yet a third potential regulatory strategy would be for the EEOC 
to issue new guidance surrounding disability-based distinctions in 
health plans that are designed to accomplish employer dumping. 
Recall that disability-based distinctions run afoul of the ADA only 
if they are a “subterfuge” to intentionally violate the ADA, which 
is in turn defined to mean that it is not justified by the costs associ-
ated with the disability.234 The EEOC could further define a “sub-
terfuge” to encompass schemes that attempt to dump those with 
specified disabilities onto individual insurance markets. Of course, 
doing this could have broad implications for all employer-based 
health plans, even those that are not actively pursuing dumping 
strategies.235 Moreover, this regulatory solution would merely limit 
one element of a motivated employer’s dumping strategy: it would 
not solve the underlying problem. 
A fourth, and relatively modest, regulatory response, alluded to 
earlier,236 is to ensure that the premiums paid by third party admin-
istrators to reinsurance programs reflect any employer dumping. 
Recall that one of the temporary reinsurance programs established 
by ACA allows HHS to determine how much third party adminis-
trators must pay, on behalf of group health plans, for reinsurance 
of individuals in the individual market.237 HHS is free to set these 
premiums substantially higher for employers that engage in dump-
ing, as measured by the number of employees who acquire cover-
 
233 See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
234 See supra Subsection I.C.3.a. 
235 Discussion of whether an employer’s ability to make disability-based distinctions 
within its health plan should be further restricted is beyond the scope of this article, 
but Bagenstos, supra note 86, at 27–32, discusses some of the issues involved.  
236 See supra Subsection I.C.3.d. 
237 Id. 
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age on an exchange. Unfortunately, this is obviously a limited solu-
tion, both because the underlying reinsurance program ends after 
three years and because it is unlikely that an increase in such pre-
miums would offset the potential benefits of employer dumping. 
One final regulatory action would be to proactively monitor in-
surance exchanges for employer dumping. In particular, insurance 
exchanges should ask whether enrollees have the option of em-
ployer-sponsored coverage, even if they are not seeking subsidies. 
Gathering data on this question would hardly be difficult, both be-
cause usage of exchanges will presumably require individuals to 
sign up and answer questions and because exchanges will need to 
verify that individuals who do receive subsidies do not have the op-
tion of affordable employer-sponsored coverage that provides 
minimum value.238 The exchanges could then study the risk profiles 
of those who were eligible for employer-provided coverage but 
nevertheless chose exchange-provided coverage. While this infor-
mation gathering would not, by itself, solve the problem of em-
ployer dumping, it would provide the data necessary to support 
legislative action if the effect of employer dumping of high-risk 
employees is significant. 
2. Statutory Solutions 
There are various potential statutory solutions to the problem of 
employer dumping. The advantages and disadvantages of each are 
discussed briefly below. 
a. Prohibit Employees with Access to Affordable Coverage from 
Enrolling in an Exchange or Other Individual Coverage 
Perhaps the simplest solution to the problem of employer dump-
ing is to make employees with access to affordable employer-
provided coverage ineligible for coverage on an exchange. Indeed, 
such a provision was apparently included in earlier versions of 
ACA.239 Moreover, this is the operative rule in Massachusetts’s ver-
 
238 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra note 109. 
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sion of health care reform.240 Making coverage through the ex-
changes unavailable to employees with the option of affordable 
employer coverage would largely eliminate the incentive that em-
ployers would have to dump high-risk employees, as they would 
not have many viable alternatives to employer coverage. As a re-
sult, labor market forces would likely dissuade employers from 
adopting this strategy, just as they have in the past. 
The one limitation of this option is that ACA does preserve the 
possibility of an individual insurance market outside state-run ex-
changes. It is therefore possible that employers might still seek to 
dump high-risk employees onto non-exchange individual markets, 
which are subject to nearly all of ACA’s prohibitions on direct and 
indirect risk classification. To address this problem, ACA could be 
amended to provide that individuals with access to affordable em-
ployer-provided coverage cannot purchase individual coverage at 
all, whether within or outside an exchange. Of course, these solu-
tions interfere with an individual’s choice of health insurance. Set-
ting aside the potential problem of employer dumping, there may 
be very good reasons why an individual might prefer individual 
coverage to that offered by her employer, and we should be reluc-
tant to interfere with that choice. 
b. Impose Limited Preexisting Condition Limitations 
Another potential solution to the employer-dumping problem is 
to amend ACA to reintroduce the ability of insurers to impose 
preexisting condition limitations for individuals with access to em-
ployer-provided coverage. This option would permit insurance 
companies in individual markets to deny coverage for preexisting 
conditions where the individual had access to affordable employer-
provided coverage, but would continue to prohibit all other types 
of preexisting condition exclusions. For example, if an employee 
with a chronic condition such as diabetes was offered affordable 
employer coverage and nevertheless sought coverage in the indi-
vidual market, insurers in the individual market would be permit-
ted to exclude coverage for the treatment of diabetes. This solution 
 
240 See An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 
2006 Mass. Acts 77 § 45 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Massachu-
setts General Laws). 
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once again takes away the viable coverage alternative for high-risk 
employees and should eliminate the primary motivation for em-
ployer dumping. It has the added advantage of continuing to pre-
serve individual choice in most circumstances. However, the pri-
mary risk of this approach is that it would complicate the absolute 
ban on preexisting condition exclusions in ACA and potentially al-
low insurers to impose these restrictions even where there was no 
credible evidence of employer dumping. It could also leave an in-
dividual without effective coverage for an existing medical condi-
tion—if an employer’s plan excluded coverage for diabetes, em-
ployees with diabetes would not be able to elect insurance on an 
exchange that covered their condition. 
c. Enact an Anti-Dumping Provision Applicable to Employers 
Dumping into the Individual Market 
As described above, ACA already contains broad anti-dumping 
standards applicable to employers who dump high-risk individuals 
into certain high-risk pools.241 These rules could be extended to ap-
ply to employer dumping into the individual market. The difficulty 
in this approach would lie in crafting a rule that was both clear and 
certain. ACA’s current anti-dumping rules for high-risk pools pro-
hibit the use of monetary or other financial incentives for disenroll-
ing in employer coverage,242 but delegate to the HHS Secretary the 
responsibility for developing and enforcing this provision.243 De-
pending on its content, a similar rule might be unattractive in the 
broader context of potential dumping into the individual market. 
For instance, there may be legitimate reasons for employers to of-
fer free choice vouchers to all their employees. Moreover, any rule 
that was contingent on the risk profiles of those individuals who 
enrolled in individual plans instead of the employer plan might un-
fairly penalize employers who lacked a motive to dump. 
 
241 See supra Subsection I.C.3.e. 
242 Supra note 103 and accompanying text 
243 See ACA § 1101(e)(1), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 142 (2010) (to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
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d. Enact Broader Employer Penalties 
The employer penalty provisions in ACA are relatively weak. 
Most important for present purposes, they only result in a mone-
tary penalty where an employee receives a premium tax credit 
through an exchange. It is for this reason that an employer can 
dump its high-risk employees on to an exchange without risking 
the prospect of paying increased taxes as a result. Enacting broader 
employer penalties could help to discourage employer dumping. 
For example, making the penalty apply to any employee who re-
ceives coverage through an exchange, regardless of whether he or 
she receives subsidies, would significantly change an employer’s 
calculus regarding dumping high-risk employees. Under such a sys-
tem, an employer would have a direct incentive to ensure that all 
employees elected coverage under the employer plan. But the pen-
alty would also have to be sufficiently high per employee to out-
weigh any financial benefit that may continue to accrue to an em-
ployer as a result of dumping a high-risk individual. For example, if 
individuals with diabetes cost the plan on average $15,000 per year 
in medical costs, paying a $5000 penalty plus a $2000 “supplemen-
tal” payment to the individual to subsidize exchange-based cover-
age may remain attractive. The advantage of amending the em-
ployer penalty is that it still preserves individual choice, while 
changing an employer’s incentive to dump. The difficulty of this 
approach would lie in determining the optimal employer penalty 
amount and the precise circumstances in which it should apply. 
e. Require All Employer Plans to Offer Essential Health Benefits 
The potential for employer dumping depends in large part on 
the ability of self-insured plans to cover a limited range of benefits 
and to vary cost-sharing requirements for different types of bene-
fits. Taking away these freedoms for self-insured plans by forcing 
them to cover essential health benefits in the same manner as in-
sured plans would thus reduce the prospect of employer dump-
ing.244 After all, a self-insured plan that must cover essential health 
benefits on the same terms as all other insured plans no longer has 
 
244 Doing so would have additional benefits as well. For a detailed discussion of the 
arguments in favor of removing the disparate treatment of self-insured plans, see 
Monahan, supra note 66. 
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the same ability to discourage enrollment by high-risk employees. 
Although the plan could still employ other strategies to achieve 
this result—such as utilizing a limited provider network—it is un-
clear how effective such a strategy would be on its own at effec-
tively separating high-risk and low-risk employees. Of course, the 
biggest downside of this approach is that, more so than any of the 
other proposals outlined above, it would likely increase the possi-
bility that employers would choose to abandon providing any cov-
erage at all. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of ACA is to increase dramatically the number 
of individuals who have health insurance coverage, while preserv-
ing the existing system of employment-based coverage for the non-
elderly. Achieving this goal is anything but simple, as illustrated in 
the complex, over 2000-page legislation that puts such change in 
motion. This Article has identified an important, unintended, and 
as-yet unnoticed effect of ACA: that employers will, for the first 
time, have both an incentive and the ability to design their plans to 
discourage enrollment by high-risk employees. By doing so, em-
ployers can benefit themselves and their employees while individ-
ual purchasers and the federal government suffer the conse-
quences. If health care reform is to have its intended effect, 
Congress and regulators must act quickly to eliminate the potential 
for employer dumping of high-risk employees. 
 
